Chinese FDI in Europe in the Wake of the Sovereign Debt Crisis by Kilaka, Benard et al.
 
 
 
 
Standard front page for projects, subject module 
projects and master theses 
 
Compulsory use for all projects and master theses on the following subjects: 
  
 International Studies 
 International Development Studies 
 Global Studies 
 Erasmus Mundus, Global Studies – A European Perspective 
 Public Administration 
 Social Science 
 EU studies 
 Public Administration, MPA 
 
User’s manual on the next page. 
 
Project title:  
Chinese FDI in Europe in the Wake of the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
Project seminar 
E14: Mandatory Course: Theme III: Global Political Economy - Globalization of goods, bads and 
welfare 
Prepared by (Name(s) and study number): Kind of project: Module: 
Benard Musembi Kilaka - 52991 Semester Project GS-K3 
Kirsten Larsen - 44943 Semester Project GS-K1 
Selina Omwaka Wambutsi - 52988 Semester Project GS-K2 
   
   
   
Name of Supervisor:  
Lindsay Whitfield 
Submission date:  
18th December 2014 
Number of keystrokes incl. spaces (Please look at the next page): 
159,863 
Permitted number of keystrokes incl. spaces cf. Supplementary Provisions (Please look at 
the next page): 
120,000 – 180,000 
 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines how Chinese FDI in Europe has responded to the privatization of public assets 
in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis. The push and pull framework is used to analyze the driving 
forces behind Chinese FDI in Europe. The analysis has pointed out that Chinese FDI has increased 
in the whole of Europe and in sovereign debt crisis countries in the period after the crisis.  By using 
the case of Greece, the paper analyses how Chinese investments have responded to privatization in 
the wake of the sovereign debt crisis. The analysis has indicated that Chinese FDI has increased in 
Greece following the privatization of state owned enterprises after the sovereign debt crisis. The 
analysis of the paper has established that privatization is a facilitating factor rather than a driving 
force for Chinese FDI in Greece in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis. Other driving forces behind 
Chinese investments in Greece are also pointed out in this paper as: 1. the opportunity to access 
markets; and 2. attractive Greece government policies in form of incentives  
 
i 
 
Glossary 
Chinese FDI: Chinese FDI stands for Chinese Foreign Direct investments. In this paper the term 
includes contracts and all types of investments by China. By all types of investments we mean 
investments in a whole company, investments in a part of a company, greenfield investments and 
concessions.  
 
Privatization:  
In this paper, we understand privatization as defined by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). The organization defines privatization in the following way: 
“Privatisation may be considered any material transaction by which the state’s ultimate ownership 
of corporate entities is reduced”1.  
Their definition includes: direct investments by the state, divestment of corporate assets by 
government-controlled investment vehicles and the dilution of state positions in SOEs by secondary 
share offerings to the non-state shareholders2.  
 
Company: In this paper company entails all kinds of businesses, both national and international. 
The term company therefore includes firms, multinational companies (MNC’s) and multinational 
enterprises (MNE’s).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1 OECD (2009) Privatisation in the 21st century: Recent Experiences of OECD countries. Report on Good practices. 
Available at : http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceofstate-ownedenterprises/48476423.pdf 
2 ibid 
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem Area 
The 21st Century has witnessed a major shift in the global economy with an increased role of emerging 
economies such as China, India and Brazil. China’s rapid rise as a major player in the current global 
economy has particularly attracted a lot of attention from academics, politicians, the media and the 
general public in many parts of the world. The flow of Chinese Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) has 
increased rapidly over the last 10 years. In 2010, Chinese firms made FDI of around €52 billion where 
the majority of the investments went to emerging and developing economies in Asia, Latin America 
and Africa (Clegg and Voss, 2012). This trend has been largely influenced by the “go global strategy”, 
which was announced by the Chinese government in 1999. This specific strategy encouraged Chinese 
companies to engage in outward FDI in order to improve their competitiveness in the global market. 
Most of the Chinese FDI is channeled through state owned enterprises though few private companies 
are increasingly investing abroad (Ebbers and Zhang, 2010: 190; Morck et al, 2008:340).   
 
Even though a large part of Chinese outward FDI is concentrated on the Asian and Latin American 
regions, recent years have seen an increasing amount of Chinese investments going to the developed 
world. For instance, Meunier (2012:2) argues that total Chinese FDI flows to Europe and North 
America in 2010 amounted to nearly 14 percent of total FDI compared to only 2 per cent two years 
earlier. Meunier (2012 and 2014: 290) further adds that Europe has since emerged as the favourite 
destination of Chinese FDI. It has experienced the fastest growth in Chinese FDI since 2008 and has 
attracted twice as much Chinese FDI as the United States since 2011. Nicolas (2014:104) also 
supports this by showing how Chinese FDI in Europe increased from $0.3 Billion in 2009 to $7.6 
billion by the year 2011. Despite this rapid growth in FDI into Europe, they still remain low when 
compared to Chinese investments in other regions or to FDI into Europe from other countries (Ebbers 
and Zhang, 2010: 189).  
 
The main locations for Chinese FDI in Europe are France, Germany and the United Kingdom 
(Nicolas, 2014: 105). Different authors and scholars have however been unable to arrive at a 
consensus regarding which country is at the top of the list among these three countries. Chinese 
companies are also investing in a number of different sectors across Europe with large investments 
concentrated in the energy, utilities, mining and infrastructure sectors (Nicolas, 2014: 108). 
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Investments also vary across countries. For example, the United Kingdom has attracted more 
headquarters of Chinese companies than France and Germany. It has also attracted investments in the 
automotive sector while France has seen Chinese investments being diversified into many sectors 
such as chemicals, textiles, electronics, energy and transport. Most investments in Germany have 
mainly been in the electronics and machinery industries (Nicolas, 2014: 108).  
 
Chinese investments in Europe are mostly done either through mergers and acquisition or through 
greenfield investments. Although the majority of investments occur through greenfield investments, 
the value of mergers and acquisition is higher (Hanemann and Rosen, 2012:35). For example, in 2011, 
there were a total of 91 Chinese investments through greenfield investments and mergers and 
acquisition.  Out of this total, there were 54 greenfield investments worth around $1.2 billion and 37 
acquisitions worth around $8.5 billion (Hanemann and Rosen, 2012:35). This high value of mergers 
and acquisition has led to intense media focus with claims that China is buying up Europe, as most 
of the investments are targeting energy firms, public utilities and firms in the financial sector 
(Meunier, 2014:110).  
 
The rapid increase of Chinese investments in European countries have attracted a lot of attention 
regarding their motives and the impacts. As a result, different countries in Europe have reacted 
differently to the increasing Chinese FDI.  For example, in France, Italy and Austria, there have been 
calls for regulations on Chinese investments especially those going into sensitive sectors such as 
security, energy and infrastructure. Other countries such as Germany, Netherlands and Britain, have 
reacted differently by welcoming Chinese FDI with open arms (Nicolas, 2014: 117-118). Despite 
these reactions, the overall impacts of Chinese FDI in Europe have so far been limited due to the 
modest levels of Chinese FDI coming to Europe (Skoba, 2014). However, some of the impacts of 
Chinese FDI in Europe can still be felt through intensified competition on host country firms as well 
as average job creations in the host countries. Additionally, there has been a resultant indirect positive 
spillover from the Chinese FDI whereby the European countries have profited from capital injections, 
returns from research and development and have gained access to the Chinese market (Nicolas, 2013).  
 
The complexity of Chinese FDI in Europe has made it impossible for academics to generalize on the 
reasons for Chinese FDI in Europe. However, there is an overall consensus among scholars that the 
financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent sovereign debt crisis that affected several European 
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countries such as Greece, Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Italy provided an additional reason for Chinese 
companies to invest in these countries (Nicolas, 2014:113). The crisis was marked by a sharp decline 
in FDI flows to Europe as potential investors lost confidence in the prevailing economic conditions. 
Countries experiencing the sovereign debt crisis were especially in a bad position because they were 
unable to access credit at the international market (Lane, 2012: 55). As a result, these countries were 
in dire need of FDI. In addition, they also sought help from international organizations such as the 
IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank. Assistance from these international 
actors was pegged on the implementation of austerity measures which included privatization of public 
assets (Zacune et al, 2013:8). These measures were to be implemented in order to reduce the high 
public spending and to help manage the huge public debt. The privatization of public assets presented 
an opportunity for Chinese companies to invest in Europe especially in countries experiencing 
sovereign debt crisis (Meunier, 2014: 292).  
 
This debt restructuring through the privatization of public assets is an interesting phenomena since 
this is the first time that the IMF and other international organizations are compelling European 
countries to implement them. However, the privatization of public assets due to debt crisis is not a 
new trend in the global economy. A precedent was set in many African countries in the 1980s and 
1990s through the infamous Structural Adjustment Programs that were pushed by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. For example, in 1983, the IMF and the World Bank 
required the Ghanaian government to implement structural adjustment programs as a conditionality 
before accessing loans. In Ghana, these structural adjustment programs were implemented under the 
Economic Recovery Programme which brought together technocrats from the Ghanaian government, 
the Bretton Woods’s institutions and external consultants (Whitfield et al, 2009: 190-192). Whitfield 
et al (2009:198) further discusses that privatization of public assets was a major condition in the 
programme. For instance, pressure from the IMF and the World Bank led to the successful 
privatization of several key commercial state assets such as the Produce Buying Company which used 
to control the internal marketing of cocoa. In addition, the government reduced its holdings in more 
that 70 percent of state assets. Further examples of structural adjustment programs which incorporated 
privatization occurred in countries such as Mali (Bergamaschi, 2009), Zambia (Frase, 2009: 305), 
Tanzania (Harrison et al, 2009:274) and Mozambique (Renzio et al, 2009: 251).  
Furthermore, privatization of public assets in Europe is not a new thing either. A number of European 
countries have an experience with privatization but the reasons for privatizing their assets were not 
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due to pressure from the IMF or the need to resolve a debt crisis. The privatization of public assets 
was first witnessed in the United Kingdom in the 1980s and later spread to other European countries 
such as Germany and France (OECD, 2003:9). Privatization of public assets further peaked in 1990s 
after a number of countries from Central and Eastern Europe joined the Economic and Monetary 
Union and had to undertake far reaching economic reforms in order to be part of the Maastricht treaty 
(OECD, 2003:9).  However, not all countries in Europe embarked on privatization of public assets 
and as a result, some countries such as Greece still had large public sectors. In Greece, the public 
sector was the largest in Europe where a quarter of the population was working in the public sector 
(Kulukundishi, 2014:89). The privatization measures that were being pushed by the IMF, the 
European Commission and the European Central Bank institutions as part of the two bailout packages 
was thus a new phenomenon in Europe. It also took place at a time when Chinese FDI in Europe was 
increasing. 
The increasing flow of Chinese FDI to Europe has thus led to a widespread public opinion that 
Chinese companies are taking advantage of the economic crisis in Europe to access public assets at 
bargain prices. However, Meunier, (2014) has sought to allay these train of thoughts by showing that 
Chinese investors have not always been motivated by the bargain prices of assets in several European 
countries. Actually in some cases, Chinese investors ended up being the highest bidders as was the 
case in Portugal when the China Three Gorges Corporation bought a 21 percent stake in the state 
owned energy company- Energias de Portugal SA in 2011 (Meunier, 2014:294).  
 
Despite the contrasting views on the extent to which Chinese investors are taking advantage of the 
sovereign debt crisis, there is a general consensus that the crisis has had a role in attracting Chinese 
FDI.  For instance, the privatization of public assets in countries that faced sovereign debt crisis has 
been cited for having attracted several Chinese investments. The privatization of state assets occurred 
in a number of countries especially those in sovereign debt crisis. Prominent examples include 
countries such as Italy, Spain and Portugal. In Portugal, the sale of the national energy company, 
Energias de Portugal SA in 2011 led to the government collecting $3.5 billion more than they had 
anticipated (Rosen and Hanemann, 2012: 52). In Italy, the Chinese State Grid International 
Development Ltd-a wholly owned subsidiary of China’s State Grid Corporation- bought a 35% stake 
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in Cassa Depositi e Prestiti Reti, a subsidiary of Italy’s state financing agency that controls the 
country’s electricity grid operator and gas distribution in 20143.  
 
The privatization of public assets in Europe especially in countries that were affected by the sovereign 
debt crisis thus presents an interesting opportunity in understanding how privatization has affected 
the driving forces behind Chinese FDI in Europe. Although there is a considerable amount of 
literature focused on Chinese FDI in Europe, most of it is concentrated on the reasons behind Chinese 
investments in Europe and the impacts (real or perceived) that these investments pose to the European 
region. Few scholars have yet to analyze how privatization of public assets have influenced the flow 
of Chinese FDI. This lack of literature maybe due to the fact that this is a current issue. This project 
will contribute to this research gap by examining the following problem formulation: 
 
How has Chinese FDI in Europe responded to privatization in the wake of the sovereign debt 
crisis? 
To answer this problem formulation, we will use the case of Greece to exemplify how Chinese 
companies have responded to the privatization of public assets following the sovereign debt crisis 
that affected a number of European countries.  
 
The privatization of public assets in Greece offers an interesting case in understanding how the 
sovereign debt crisis opened up new opportunities for Chinese FDI in Europe. Greece was one of the 
countries whose economy was adversely affected by the sovereign debt crisis. In addition, it was the 
first country to receive a bailout package in May 2010 (Lane, 2012: 57). By 2011, Greece also had 
the highest levels of public debt in the Euro zone as well as the biggest budget deficits (Nelson et al 
2011:1). As a response to the crisis, the Greek government appealed to the IMF and the European 
Union for help. Although late, the response of the IMF and the European Union took the form of bail 
out packages that required the Greek government to implement several structural reforms in order to 
boost growth and reduce the level of public debt (Lane, 2012: 57). Key among these structural reforms 
was the privatization of public assets that was intended to raise €50 billion (Zacune et al, 2013: 9). 
                                                          
3Sanderson (2014) ‘China swoops in on Italy’s power grids and luxury brands: EU debt crisis opened up periphery 
countries to Chinese investors’, Financial Times; last updated October 7th 2014 retrieved from 
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/1bd60160-4496-11e4-bce8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3M6ivQoh1  
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Apart from privatization, the Greek government has also been keen to attract FDI in the belief that it 
will help generate growth and create jobs within its economy. The Greek government has thus 
implemented a number of reforms that are geared towards creating a conducive environment for 
foreign investors. In addition, it has also directly sought for investments from China.   
 
As a result, Greece emerged as one of the top ten destinations in Europe for Chinese FDI by 2011 
(Rosen and Hanemann, 2012: 38). Interestingly though, a bulk of Chinese FDI in Greece has been 
concentrated in the infrastructure sector. Chinese investments are also found in other sectors of the 
economy such as the real estate and energy. It is against this background that we feel that the case of 
Greece will help us illustrate and analyze whether the sovereign debt crisis and the privatization of 
public assets has opened up new opportunities for Chinese FDI into Europe and whether Chinese FDI 
has responded to these opportunities. Furthermore, it will also help in understanding the motivations 
behind the Chinese investments into Europe after the sovereign debt crisis. This study will be guided 
by the following working questions; 
 
Working questions:  
1. What are the driving forces behind Chinese FDI in Europe? 
2. How is privatization a part of the reactions that the European countries and the international 
financial institutions had towards the sovereign debt crisis? 
3. How have the driving forces behind Chinese FDI in Europe responded to privatization as 
exemplified by the case of Greece?   
 
1.2 Project design 
This paper is structured into six chapters.  The first chapter entails an introduction to the problem area 
and the working questions that will guide the research. The second chapter contains the methodology. 
In it, we discuss our methodological choices of data and the conceptual framework used in this paper. 
The chapter further discusses the choice of Greece as a case for our study and points out limitations 
that the study could have. The third chapter provides a discussion of the conceptual framework used 
to analyze the driving forces behind Chinese FDI in Europe. Chapter four on the other hand offers a 
discussion on the background to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and the reactions that followed 
this crisis. The reactions from governments, the European Union and IMF are also discussed in this 
chapter and particularly for the case of Greece. Chapter 5 of the paper offers our analysis of Chinese 
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FDI in Europe in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis. We provide an overall analysis of Chinese 
FDI in the entire Europe and particularly for the countries in sovereign debt crisis. Additionally, we 
use the case of Greece to analyze how Chinese FDI has responded to privatization of state owned 
assets in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis and further point to other driving forces for Chinese 
investments. Chapter 6 offers the conclusion of our research based on our findings and some after 
thoughts on the researched area.  
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2. Methodology 
In this section, we seek to discuss our methodological choices of data, the case of Greece and our 
conceptual framework. The discussion will entail considerations on our choices and how they have 
shaped our final conclusions. Consequently this discussion will make it clear what limitations the 
project’s findings may have.  
 
2.1 Sources of data 
The data used throughout this paper consist mostly of secondary data on the sovereign debt crisis in 
Europe and Greece. We have based our conceptual framework on academic papers, but in the analysis 
of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and Greece, we have been compelled to use gray literature such 
as working papers, reports, newspapers and websites. The reason behind this, is that Chinese FDI in 
Europe and Greece after the sovereign debt crisis is a new phenomenon, as the sovereign debt crisis 
in Europe and Greece did not start before 2009. Consequently, there have been limitations on the 
academic literature available.  
Besides the reliance on gray literature, we have used a dataset in our analysis of Chinese FDI in 
Europe and Greece. The Heritage Foundation has produced a China Global Investment Tracker, 
which is a complete dataset that contains all Chinese investments and contracts from 2005 to June 
2014. This database has made it possible for us to extract data that fits our research focus on overall 
Europe, the sovereign debt crisis countries and Greece after the sovereign debt crisis and produce our 
own figures.  
The gray literature and dataset used in this paper will be discussed in the following section, together 
with a discussion of how these sources of data could have influenced the paper and its findings. We 
will start by examining and discussing the working papers and reports used throughout this paper. 
 
Gray literature 
Privatizing Europe- using the crisis to entrench neoliberalism by Joseph Zacune with contributions 
from Nick Buxton, Brid Brennan, Satoko Kishimoto, Antonio Tricarico and Tommaso Fattori (2013), 
The Transnational Institute (TNI) 
This working paper has been used in our examination of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and 
Greece. Furthermore, it has been used to examine the responses that countries and institutions had 
towards the sovereign debt crisis. As the title indicates, the report examines the privatization measures 
that were taken in Europe after the crisis and argues that this is a way to entrench neoliberalism in the 
political system. It can be argued that the working paper has a rather critical view on the existing 
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neoliberal political system. The Transnational Institute, which published the paper is a institute which 
according to their own website, has the following mission: “TNI’s mission is to strengthen 
international social movements with rigorous research, reliable information, sound analysis and 
constructive proposals that advance progressive, democratic policy change and common solutions to 
global problems” 4.  
 
The Greek Crisis: Social Impact and Policy Responses by Manos Matsaganis, (2013) the Friedrich 
Ebert Stiftung:  
This report has been used in the examination of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece and the responses 
that was initiated from the crisis. The author is a Greek professor at Athens University of Economics 
and Business and has extremely engaged in analysing the impacts of the Greek sovereign debt crisis. 
The report was published from the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, a German institute named after the first 
democratic president in Germany. According to the institute’s own website, one of the institute’s goal 
is to analyse the values and thoughts behind democracy5.  
 
The Gold Standard, the Euro, and the origins of the Greek Sovereign Debt Crisis by Harris Dellas 
and George S. Tavlas, (2013).  The Cato Institute:   
This report has been used to examine the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, as it gives a good description 
of the origins of the crisis in Greece. The Cato institute which published the report is an American 
research institute and think tank. According to the institute’s website it is “…dedicated to the 
principles of individual liberty, limited government, free markets and peace.6” The terms individual 
liberty and free market indicates that the ideological lineages of the institute could be towards 
liberalism.   
 
Greece’s Debt Crisis: Overview, Policy Responses, and Implications by Rebecca M. Nelson, Paul 
Belkin, and Derek E. Mix (2011). The Congressional Research Service:  
This report has, like the one above, been used to examine the sovereign debt crisis in Greece. This 
report has been published by the Congressional Research Service, a U.S government department that 
conducts research and analysis to the United States Congress and therefore assists in all legislation 
                                                          
4Mission and Vision of the Transnational Institute (2013, October 16). Transnational Institute. Retrieved on 15th 
December 2013 at  http://www.tni.org/page/mission-and-vision-transnational-institute  
5 http://www.fes.de/sets/s_stif.htm  
6 About Cato (n.d) Cato Institute retrieved on 15th December at  http://www.cato.org/about  
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processes. According to the department’s website, it analyses a topic from all perspectives and sides7. 
This indicates that it is cautious of advancing one specific ideology.  
 
China Invests in Europe: Patterns, Impacts and Policy Implications by Thilo Hanemann and Daniel 
H. Rosen, (2012). The Rhodium Group:  
This report is used in the introductory section and in the analysis of Chinese FDI in Greece’s 
infrastructure sector, as it provides data on Chinese FDI in Europe and good case examples. Rhodium 
Group, which produced this report, is a research company that produces research to companies or 
governments. The authors behind this report are both researchers at Rhodium Group8.  
 
How much did the competitiveness of the Greek economy decline since EMU entry? by Dimitris 
Malliaropulos, (2010). The Eurobank Research:  
This last report has its focus on the crisis in Greece and how this has changed its competitiveness. 
Consequently, we have used it in the examination of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece as its focus 
on competitiveness added a new perspective. The Eurobank research is a private research centre or 
think tank which provides research to the Eurobank Group. The Eurobank Group is a European 
banking organization that operates in eight countries. It is one of the biggest banks in Greece9. This 
research determines the Eurobank’s investment strategies and position on economic issues10.  
 
Conclusively, the working papers and reports used throughout the report are from various institutes 
and private research centres. From the above discussion it can be argued that some of these could 
have ideological lineages which could influence the content and findings of the working papers and 
reports. However we have estimated that these reports were necessary in order to get enough 
information about the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and Greece. In order to minimize the influence 
of these reports’ possible ideological lineages on our findings, we have to a large extent excluded the 
reports’ analysis and only used their descriptions and data. Additionally, we have, where possible, 
supported the descriptions and arguments with other sources of reference in order to make it more 
reliable. 
                                                          
7 About CRS (n.d) www.loc.gov retrieved on 15th December 2014 at  http://www.loc.gov/crsinfo/about/  
8 Rhodium Group (n.d, website) http://rhg.com/  
9  Eurobank (n.d) A European banking organization that actively supports the economy. www.eurobank.gr retrieved on 
17th December 2014 at http://www.eurobank.gr/online/home/index.aspx?lang=en  
10 ibid 
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We have chosen to supplement our examination of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and Greece 
with information from various newspapers and websites. We are aware that different newspapers and 
websites can have different ideological lineages, just like reports and working papers can. However, 
the amount of academic literature on privatization in Greece is limited, so it has been necessary to 
supplement with information from newspapers and websites.  
 
The newspapers in this report are a mix of international and local Greek newspapers, capturing both 
news that have reached the international community and local news. These newspapers have given 
information about both present and future investments and privatization measures that were not 
visible in the reports or on the Greek government’s website. The websites used the most, are the 
European Union’s, the IMF’s and the Greek government websites. The reason for this is that these 
institutions were the ones that reacted towards the sovereign debt crisis in Europe and Greece and 
therefore contain the most information about the matter.   
 
All these different types of gray literature may have been influenced by the ideological lineages of 
the institutes, newspapers or authors. Our reliance on these different types of gray literature has 
therefore made our conclusions less definitive compared to if we had used primary data throughout 
this paper. However, it would not have been possible to gather this information as primary data, both 
because of time limitations and limited access to the information needed.  
 
Dataset from Heritage Foundation 
We have used a complete dataset in our analysis of Chinese FDI in Europe and Greece. Our dataset 
is the China Global Investment Tracker 2014 from the Heritage Foundation which contains all 
Chinese investments and contracts in all countries from 2005 through to June 2014. The dataset has 
made it possible for us to make our own figures with a focus on overall Europe, the sovereign debt 
crisis countries and Greece. We have almost exclusively relied on this dataset in our analysis of 
Chinese FDI flows to Europe and Greece. It is of course critical that our analysis of Chinese FDI in 
Greece, the sovereign debt crisis countries and Europe rely on the same data source. However, there 
was no other public dataset available that could analyse all these aspects. Eurostat offers data on 
Chinese FDI in Europe, however there are no specific data on the sovereign debt crisis, Greece or the 
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sectors. As a result, we have decided to use the dataset from Heritage Foundation and then include a 
discussion of the dataset’s limitations in the following section.    
 
Heritage Foundation which produced the dataset is an American conservative think tank. According 
to the foundation’s website, it has the mission of formulating and promoting conservative public 
policies11. This indicates that their reports and findings could have been influenced by this ideological 
lineage. We have been aware of this and have therefore not used any analysis or conclusions from the 
foundation. We have only used the data collected in the China Global Investment Tracker from 2005 
to June 2014 and from this, developed our own figures and analysis. However the method used by 
the Heritage Foundation can still have influenced our analysis and we will therefore discuss this 
method.   
  
There are many ways to measure Chinese FDI. The China Global Investment Tracker from Heritage 
Foundation is based on corporate data, instead of national data, making it possible to compare from 
country to country. The data set includes direct investments, contracts and troubled transactions. In 
our analysis of Chinese FDI we have excluded troubled transactions as these represent failed or 
disrupted investments, which is not our research focus. Excluded from the dataset is bond purchases 
and transaction under $100 million. However, transactions under $100 million would have given a 
more accurate picture of Chinese FDI in Greece and its sectors. Unfortunately the Heritage 
Foundation saw these as insignificant in the overall picture of Chinese FDI12. Consequently, the 
investments and contracts recorded in Greece and the sovereign debt crisis countries are few if we 
examine them per year. As a result our figures have very large variances from year to year as one big 
investment drastically changes the flow of Chinese FDI. In Chapter 5 several examples illustrate this 
trend.  
 
In our construction of the figures indicating Chinese FDI in overall Europe, the sovereign debt crisis 
countries and Greece, we are using data from the China Global Investment Tracker from 2008 to June 
2014. Although the dataset contains data from 2005, we only include data from 2008 as we are 
interested in examining how much Chinese FDI changed due to the financial crisis. In our 
                                                          
11 About Heritage (n.d) www.heritage.org retrieved on 15th December 2014 at http://www.heritage.org/about  
12Scissors, D. (2011, July 11) Chinese Outward Investment: More Opportunity Than Danger. www.heritage.org 
retrieved on 15th December 2014 from http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2011/07/chinese-outward-
investment-more-opportunity-than-danger  
13 
 
construction of the figures indicating the sector division after the sovereign debt crisis in overall 
Europe, the sovereign debt crisis countries and Greece, we have used data from 2009 to June 2014. 
2009 was the first year that Chinese FDI flows were affected by the financial crisis (see also chapter 
5) and we therefore chose that data from 2009 onwards could measure this aspect.   
 
The limitations of the dataset - China Global Investment Tracker 2014 - and the way that Heritage 
Foundation collected the data have influenced our figures and analysis. For examples, if investments 
under $100 million were included, the table for Chinese FDI in Greece could have looked different. 
The reliability of our tables and findings are therefore less definitive than they would have been if we 
had collected the data ourselves. However, it was unfortunately not an option to collect this large a 
dataset ourselves.  
 
Additionally, our own choices have also influenced the figures and ultimately our analysis. For 
example our choice of measuring the sector division after 2009 have shaped our findings, as some 
sectors could have been substantially larger if we measured it from 2005 onwards.   
 
2.2 The case of Greece 
In this paper, we have used Greece as a case to elucidate how Chinese FDI in Europe reacted to the 
privatization of public assets in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe. Our reasons for 
choosing a case to elucidate this aspect was that our research focus compelled us to analyse one of 
the sovereign debt crisis countries that had privatized a large part of their public assets in the wake of 
the sovereign debt crisis. As privatization of public assets mainly took place in the sovereign debt 
crisis countries, we saw it as crucial to use a sovereign debt crisis country as a case to analyse this 
aspect.  
 
There were several reasons why we chose Greece as our case. First of all, Greece was the worst hit 
country by the crisis and can therefore clearly illustrate the privatization measures that the sovereign 
debt crisis countries were forced to implement. Secondly, Greece was the first country to face a 
sovereign debt crisis in May 2010. Being the first, Greece was also the country where the privatization 
measures were first implemented (Lane 2012: 57). Consequently, there is more literature and data 
about the sovereign debt crisis and the privatization measures implemented in Greece compared to 
the other sovereign debt crisis countries. Finally, Greece is still attracting larger amounts of Chinese 
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FDI since the sovereign debt crisis started in 2009. According to data from the China Global 
Investment Tracker from the Heritage Foundation, Chinese FDI in Greece have been increasing since 
2010 (see figure 4, chapter 5). Chinese FDI flows to Greece illustrate that something have changed 
after the sovereign debt crisis. The case of Greece therefore opens up for a discussion of privatization 
and how this has affected the Chinese investors’ motivations for engaging in FDI.  
Overall, the case of Greece has made it possible to answer our problem formulation with a detailed 
discussion of privatization. As Greece is a crucial part of this paper, we have included the case of 
Greece in some chapters. For example, chapter four, which discusses the results the sovereign debt 
crisis in Europe is followed by an examination of the sovereign debt crisis in Greece.  
 
As we have chosen to use the case of Greece to answer our problem formulation, instead of a full 
examination of all European countries that have privatized after the sovereign debt crisis, we cannot 
generalize our findings. Consequently, our findings are limited to Greece. However, the case of the 
Greece can indicate a trend that is taking place in Europe after the sovereign debt crisis.    
 
2.3 The conceptual framework  
After conducting a literature review on the driving forces behind Chinese FDI in Europe, we decided 
that the best way to capture all aspects would be to divide the driving forces into push and pull factors. 
The overall strategies for Chinese companies to engage in FDI, discussed in the conceptual 
framework, do not capture country specific factors. The pull and push framework contain both the 
overall strategies and the more country specific factors, like government policies and home and host 
country environment. Based on these considerations we have chosen to use the push and pull factors 
as our conceptual framework.  
 
The push factors are divided into two sections: Chinese government policies and China’s domestic 
environment. These push factors describe the driving forces in China that is compelling Chinese 
companies to engage in FDI. These factors are therefore the same for all Chinese investors and are 
not specific for Chinese FDI in Europe. We have chosen not to discuss these push factors in our 
analysis as the push factors driving the Chinese investors to Europe have not changed substantially 
after the sovereign debt crisis. The Chinese economy was not severely affected by the financial crisis, 
so neither the government policies nor the home environment in China have been changed (Li et al, 
2012) 
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On the other hand, the environment in Europe changed considerably after the sovereign debt crisis. 
As a result, the pull factors driving Chinese investments to Europe and Greece are therefore discussed 
and analysed in this paper. The pull factors that we have chosen include: the availability of strategic 
assets in Europe, opportunity to access markets in Europe, European government policies and the 
sovereign debt crisis. Our reasons for choosing strategic assets and markets are that scholars point to 
these as the most common motivations behind Chinese FDI in Europe. Our choice of government 
policies and the sovereign debt crisis is based partly on the academic literature and partly on our own 
research focus on privatization. After an analysis of Chinese FDI in Europe and Greece, the rest of 
the analysis will be structured after these pull factors.  
Our conceptual framework has made it possible to analyse the motivations behind Chinese FDI in 
Europe and Greece in detail and to analyse whether privatization after the sovereign debt crisis could 
be one of these motivations.   
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3. The driving forces behind Chinese FDI in Europe 
In order to determine how Chinese FDI in Europe has been affected by the privatization of public 
assets, we will first examine what is driving the Chinese companies to invest in Europe. The 
motivations behind FDI have been debated for over three decades and the economic rise of China has 
made a common academic standpoint even more unlikely. The first section of this Chapter presents 
a literature review outlining some of these different standpoints. This will be followed by a discussion 
of our chosen conceptual framework which analyzes the driving forces for Chinese investment in 
Europe. 
 
3.1 From Dunning’s eclectic (OLI) paradigm to pull and push factors 
John H. Dunning’s eclectic paradigm (or better known as the OLI paradigm), which was first 
presented at the Nobel Symposium in Stockholm in 1976, has been the dominant analytical 
framework in describing foreign activities and FDI by companies. Overall the paradigm consists of 
three interrelated components: Ownership, Location and Internalization (OLI) (Dunning, 2000). 
These three components will at any given time determine whether or not a company will engage in 
FDI or, as Dunning describes it, international production. 
    
The first component, ownership (O), consists of the competitive advantages that a company possesses 
in one or several markets (Dunning, 2001).  He explains that these advantages can be because the 
company either owns (therefore the name ownership) or have access to assets that can create income 
and profits. Another reason can be because the company is able to combine these income-generating 
assets with other assets from other countries or markets and thereby gain a competitive advantage 
that their competitors do not have. He also characterizes these assets as transferable assets, 
emphasizing that these assets are not located in a physical place. This ownership component of the 
paradigm stresses that the better the company’s comparative advantages are, compared to other 
companies, the more likely it is to start or increase foreign production and investments (Dunning, 
2000). 
 
The second component of the OLI paradigm is location (L) and this entails the advantages that a 
company can gain by moving their production to another region or country. This component, as 
opposed to the ownership component, is located in a specific place and Dunning refers to these assets 
as non-transferable (Dunning, 2001). This component avows that a company is more likely to engage 
in FDI if the value-adding activities and assets that it needs, are present in a foreign location. 
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Following this logic, the company will only strengthen their ownership advantage by moving the 
production to a foreign location (Dunning, 2000).  
 
The third and last component, internalization (I), is the alternative ways in which a company can gain 
new competitive advantages through internalization. These advantages can be gained through 
participation in the open market, use of intermediate markets or the purchase of foreign companies. 
This component avers that the more benefits the company can gain through an internalization strategy, 
the more likely it is that the company will engage in foreign production itself (Dunning, 2000).  
 
Dunning is well aware that the eclectic (OLI) paradigm is highly contextual. The precise components 
of the paradigm therefore depends on the company’s home country, the country that the company 
wish to invest in, the industry, the activities that the company engage in and the company’s strategies 
(Dunning, 2000). 
Based on the eclectic paradigm four main types of motivations have been identified:  
1. Market seeking, the search for foreign markets. 2. Resource seeking, the search for natural 
resources. 3. Efficiency seeking, the search for a more efficient division of labor. 4. Strategic asset 
seeking, the search for advantages that can gain the company a competitive advantage (Dunning, 
1977). 
 
The eclectic (OLI) paradigm, which was originally based on companies from developed countries 
engaging in FDI, has been widely criticized for not capturing all motivations behind FDI especially 
after countries like China started to engage in FDI (Peng, 2012; Buckley et. al, 2007). For example, 
Peng (2012) concurs with Dunning (2000) and argues that MNC’s from China seek profitable 
locations (L) and internalizing activities (I), but do not possess superior technology or better 
managerial skills. He argues that a big part of the Chinese companies’ ownership advantages (O) are 
missing, and that the eclectic paradigm therefore cannot solely explain the motivations behind 
companies’ foreign activities and investments. Buckley et. al (2007) argue that it is highly unlikely 
that Chinese companies will be motivated by the search for more efficiency. Efficiency-seeking 
typically occur when a company searches for lower-cost location, which the Chinese do not need 
because the labor costs in parts of China are already extremely low.  
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The flaws and gaps that the traditional OLI paradigm seems to have when explaining the motivations 
behind FDI by Chinese companies have encouraged scholars to examine this in more detail. One of 
the most prominent scholars, Deng (2004), has extended the paradigm by adding more motivations 
and excluding some of the four motivations proposed by Dunning (2000). He presents five 
motivations: resource seeking, technology seeking, market seeking, diversification seeking and 
strategic asset seeking. Three motivations are similar to those proposed by Dunning (market seeking, 
resource seeking and strategic asset seeking). Excluded from Deng’s (2004) framework is the 
efficiency seeking motivation, perhaps based on the same reason as explained above and added is 
instead technology-seeking and diversification seeking. What is interesting is that he, like Peng 
(2012), does not assume that companies have superior technology which is encouraging them to 
invest abroad. Instead, Deng (2004) argues that one of the motivations that drives Chinese companies 
to invest abroad is their search for sophisticated technology that can give them a competitive 
advantage that they do not have. According to him, this can help explain why Chinese companies are 
investing in developed countries instead of solely investing in other emerging or developing 
countries.  
 
Another motivation that Deng (2004) adds, diversification-seeking, is an attempt to capture how the 
home country environment is influencing MNC’s strategies - an aspect that the eclectic paradigm did 
not capture. He avers that government policies and increased competition in China is forcing Chinese 
MNC’s to look for new possibilities and engage in FDI. He emphasizes that diversification seeking 
is mainly chased by companies that have monopoly in a specific industry and have engaged in foreign 
trade before. Deng’s (2004) argument on increased competition corresponds with Vernon’s product 
cycle model. This model argues that the natural development of products and markets motivate 
companies to go abroad. According to this model, a product evolves to a stage where it is 
standardized, causing other firms to acquire tacit knowledge from the original producer and 
eventually learn to imitate this standardized production process. Consequently, the original producer 
loses his competitive advantage and is forced to move the production to overseas production sites 
where the wage costs are considerably lower. According to this argument, FDI becomes inevitable as 
competitive pressures forces the original producers to invest abroad (Schwartz, 2010: 224ff).     
 
Even though, Deng’s (2004) diversification seeking motivation and the product cycle model captures 
one aspect of how the home country market can influence companies’ strategies, the scope of this 
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framework is still limited. Specifically, the framework fails to capture country specific factors  that 
can influence a firm to invest abroad. Some scholars have therefore found it useful to apply a concept 
of push and pull factors to understand the driving forces behind Chinese FDI (Ebber and Zhang, 2010; 
Wei, 2010). This categorization does not contradict the traditional approach but it takes a broader 
perspective in analyzing the driving forces behind FDI. Importantly, the framework analyses how 
firms engaging in FDI are influenced by factors emanating from both home and host country. The 
pull factors according to this framework refer to favorable natural and economic endowments that are 
present in the host countries which lure Chinese companies to invest and expand their businesses 
abroad. The push factors on the other hand, refer to conditions present in China that either facilitate 
or compel the Chinese companies to engage in FDI (Ebber and Zhang, 2010:192; Wei, 2010:99). 
 
In this paper, we consider the push and pull framework as more appropriate in understanding the 
driving forces for Chinese FDI. Our choice of the framework is based on the fact that the push and 
pull framework entails the strategies discussed by Deng (2004) and Peng (2012) as well as more 
country-specific factors. In the next section, we seek to examine the push and pull factors that drive 
Chinese companies to invest in Europe based on this framework. In our analysis we will draw on both 
the strategies examined above and specific factors in China and Europe.  
 
3.2 Push factors for Chinese FDI in Europe 
As defined in the previous section of this paper, the push factors refer to the political and economic 
conditions existent within China which compel the Chinese firms to engage in overseas investments 
(Ebber and Zhang, 2010: 192). The push factors for Chinese outward FDI can basically be derived 
from examining the macroeconomic aspects related to the government as well as the domestic market 
conditions in China. This section seeks to discuss such factors with reference to Chinese companies’ 
investments in Europe. It is however important to point out that  the factors may not be specific to 
Chinese FDI in Europe, but may  also be used to explain overall Chinese  FDI in other contexts.  This 
is the case because most of these factors are explained in the context of the home country environment 
and would therefore cross cut among host countries engaging with China. 
Based on literature review, we have classified the factors that have ‘pushed’ Chinese firms to invest 
in Europe into two: 1. Chinese government policies and 2. Chinese domestic environment. 
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Chinese government policies 
Different scholars like Nicolas (2014), Gattai (2009) and Ebber and Zhang (2010) point out that some 
policies adopted by the Chinese government, have played an immense role in determining Chinese 
outward FDI. According to Gattai (2009), the outward investments by Chinese companies has 
evolved from a period in the 1980s where FDI flows were highly regulated  and restricted by the 
central government, to present era of a  hyperbolic growth of Chinese multinational activity. She 
points out that the period between 1999 and 2002 was particularly influential in the transformation of 
Chinese FDI. This period marked a starting point where the Chinese government started to seriously 
encourage Chinese companies to invest overseas. The Chinese government specifically encouraged 
companies that were involved in light industries like textile, machinery and electrical equipment to 
venture into overseas investments. In order to advance their international involvement, such 
companies continued to benefit from export tax rebates, foreign exchange assistance and financial 
support from the government (Gattai, 2009). 
 
 According to Child and Rodrigues (2005:399), an evolutionary breakthrough came in 1999 with the 
launch of the ‘Go Global’ policy by the Chinese government. They explain that this policy was 
specifically aimed at encouraging strong Chinese enterprises to increase their engagement in foreign 
investments for purposes of improving their competitiveness and securing an international business 
presence. More specifically, the policy facilitated better foreign exchange related regulations and 
aided the removal of obstacles for overseas investments by streamlining administrative procedures 
and providing necessary information and guidance to Chinese companies engaging in FDI (Gattai, 
2009: 246; Ebber and Zhang, 2010: 193).  
 
Additionally, Child and Rodrigues (2005: 400) argue that financial institutions controlled by the 
Chinese government, have also been used as tools for sponsoring the expansion for overseas 
investments. Institutions such as the China State Bank and China Development Bank have facilitated 
this process through a favorable financial backing in the form of low interest loans and credits to 
Chinese companies engaging in FDI. Although the ‘Go Global’ strategy was a policy for the overall 
Chinese FDI, Ebber and Zhang (2010: 193) emphasize that this policy also became a significant 
motivation behind Chinese FDI in the European region. Just like Chinese outward FDI increased in 
other regions following these policies, Europe was not an exception. For example, through financial 
support from the Chinese government, a company like Haier has managed to localize its technology, 
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brand and production in huge and sophisticated markets in the European Union (Child and Rodrigues, 
2005: 399).  
 
It is important to note that different scholars do not reach a consensus on how to conceptualize the 
role of Chinese government policies in ‘pushing’ Chinese companies to venture in investments 
overseas. While some scholars like Ebber and Zhang (2010) perceive it to be a driving force, others 
like Nicolas (2014) and Gattai (2009) understand it to be a facilitating factor. For this reason, such 
scholars lay emphasis on other factors related to the Chinese domestic environment as well.  
 
China’s domestic environment 
According to Child and Rodrigues (2005: 399), domestic conditions in China have also compelled 
Chinese companies to pursue FDI in Europe as well as in other regions. Based on the literature, we 
have conceptualized these domestic conditions into two: 1. Market constraints, and 2. Institutional 
constraints.  
 
Different authors arrive at an agreement that the existing market condition in China has largely 
facilitated the movement of Chinese companies to invest overseas. Scholars like Deng (2007:78), 
Nicolas (2014: 113), Child and Rodrigues (2005: 402), Gugler and Boie (2008: 16) all agree that 
fierce competition in the Chinese domestic market has led to overcapacity and a reduction of the 
profit margin in the domestic market.  Nicolas (2014) further argues that China’s accession to the 
World Trade Organization in 2001 meant an increased commitment towards liberal trade policies. 
Consequently, this introduced more competition on the Chinese domestic market leading to 
overcapacity and reduced profit margins. This has been typical in the Chinese home appliances 
market. Deng (2007: 78) for instance uses the case of Haier, a Chinese firm as an example to further 
illustrate this. He argues that the Chinese home appliance market witnessed multiple price wars after 
the mid-1990s which limited the development of companies like Haier in the domestic market. Just 
like Nicolas (2014), he also attributes this occurrence to admission of China to the World Trade 
Organization in 2001. According to Deng (2007), this gave a chance to all competitors of Haier across 
the globe to invest in China. As a result, Haier devised a defensive strategy of establishing its 
subsidiaries in the home countries of its major competitors in Europe and the United States in order 
to achieve its goal of competing globally. From this example, it is clear that there is pressure for 
Chinese companies to engage in FDI in order to reduce reliance on the competitive domestic markets. 
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It is on such basis that some scholars have argued that overcapacity, high market shares and failing 
prices in the  Chinese domestic market are the  key impetus for Chinese firms to venture into FDI in 
other regions like Europe ( Nicolas, 2014 :113, Child and Rodrigues 2005: 402 ). 
 
As mentioned above, there are also other institutional constraints that drive the Chinese firms to 
engage in FDI. Child and Rodrigues (2005: 402) assert that some Chinese firms venture into foreign 
investments in order to escape institutional restrictions at home. According to them, legal constraints 
and obstruction of domestic acquisition are some of institutional constraints that remain a problem in 
the Chinese domestic environment. Gugler and Boie (2008: 20) support this argument and argue that 
we should look at the deficiency of certain factors in the Chinese domestic environment that drives 
the Chinese companies to pursue FDI. According to these scholars therefore, some of the institutional 
constraints in the Chinese domestic environment include lack of training and education, lack of a 
properly developed intellectual property rights, shortage of managerial and skilled labour and 
corruption. Therefore, it can be argued that it is such institutional constraints that have also ‘pushed’ 
the Chinese firms to engage in FDI in Europe and other regions in the world.  
 
It is necessary to clarify at this point that the analysis of the push factors for Chinese FDI in Europe 
offered above, is only aimed at creating an understanding of the Chinese home environment 
conditions which have influenced the outward FDI of Chinese companies. However, these push 
factors will not be incorporated into our analysis where we seek to understand how privatization has 
influenced the flow of Chinese FDI in Europe in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis. Analyzing this 
aspect is limited to understanding how the conditions in the European environment have attracted 
Chinese FDI in the European region. Because of this, our analysis will solely be based on the ‘pull’ 
factors for Chinese FDI in Europe. The next section of this paper provides an analysis of the factors 
within Europe that have attracted Chinese FDI. 
 
3.3 Pull Factors for Chinese FDI in Europe 
Zhang and Ebbers (2010: 192) point out that pull factors refer to the host country characteristics such 
as potential market and other locational advantages that attract foreign capital. Several pull factors 
have been highlighted as being major driving forces behind Chinese FDI in Europe. This section will 
thus expound more on these factors which are: 1. availability of strategic assets in Europe, 2. the need 
for market, and 3. the effects of sovereign debt crisis that affected many southern European countries.  
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Availability of strategic assets in Europe 
One of the main driving forces pulling Chinese FDI to Europe has been their desire to acquire strategic 
assets that are possessed by many European firms. As early as the 1970s, Dunning (1977) already 
identified strategic asset seeking to be one of the driving forces for MNCs to invest abroad. He argued 
that companies are motivated to invest abroad in order to seek assets that can gain them competitive 
advantage (Dunning, 1977).  Deng (2007:74) posits that “strategic asset seeking is the primary 
motivation underlying Chinese firms’ foreign investments”. He further argues that these strategic 
assets are acquired in order to enhance the global competitiveness of Chinese firms and to ensure they 
gain new capabilities in the host country. Deng (2009: 75) defines strategic assets as assets that are 
difficult to trade and imitate, scarce, appropriable and specialized resources and capabilities that 
bestow the firm’s competitive advantage. They include reputation, buyer-supplier relationships, tacit 
knowledge, research and development capability, brand name, knowledge and proprietary 
technologies. Deng (2007: 74) further elaborates that these strategic assets are usually acquired 
through two main ways: mergers and acquisitions and greenfield investments. 
  
Being latecomers, Chinese firms face various competitive disadvantages such as possession of 
outdated technology, limited knowledge of overseas markets and the lack of internationally known 
brands or trade names amongst others (Child and Rodrigues, 2005: 386). These disadvantages have 
thus motivated them to invest in Europe in order to acquire strategic assets that will help them improve 
on their competitiveness both in the domestic and global market.  Deng (2007: 74) for instance argues 
that they have been seeking strategic resources such as superior skills, marketing expertise and 
proprietary technologies.  In fact, there have been several Chinese investments across Europe that 
have been triggered by their need to acquire strategic assets. For example, TCL’s merger with 
France’s Thomson Electronics Company Limited and Alcatel Mobile Phones Limited enabled it to 
acquire more brand names, high end expertise and existing buyer-supplier relationships (Deng, 2009: 
81). China’s TCL Company’s merger with Thomson was particularly important as it gave TCL 
effective control of Thomson’s television plants in France, Poland and Thailand thus making TCL 
the largest manufacturer of televisions globally. This merger enabled TCL have access to core 
proprietary technology that was previously held by Thomson Electronics Company (Deng, 2007: 76).   
A close analysis of Chinese FDI in different European countries reveals a very interesting pattern 
with regard to their search for strategic assets. Their investment decisions seem to be influenced by 
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the strengths that are possessed by different countries.  This point is captured clearly by Gattai (2009: 
252) and Nicolas (2014:111) who argue that Chinese FDI in the European Union is encouraged by 
the need to acquire skills and technologies that inward FDI flows to China are unable to deliver. As 
a result, their investments in Europe are dictated by opportunistic considerations as they tend to select 
sectors for which a given a country has a particular strength. As a result, they mostly invest in 
electronics and machinery in Germany, in automobile in UK, research and technology in Sweden and 
design in Italy.  
  
Access to markets  
The need to access foreign markets has been another major pull factor behind the growing Chinese 
FDI flows to Europe. Indeed, a number of scholars such as Nicolas (2014:111) and Ebbers and Zhang 
(2010: 192) affirm that the need to access the European market has been the main driving force behind 
the growing outward Chinese FDI flows to the European Union.  
 
The desire to access markets has further been motivated by the need to bypass the high tariffs and 
quotas that are directed towards Chinese exports. In order to bypass these restrictions, several Chinese 
firms have opted to move production to low cost countries within the European Union and hence 
accessed the European market unhindered (Nicolas, 2014: 109 ). Chinese investments in countries 
such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania can be seen in this light (Ebbers and Zhang, 2010: 191). TCL’s 
purchase of Schneider Electronics in Germany can also be seen as a way in which the Chinese firm 
has been able to circumvent European import quotas (Nicolas, 2014: 113). TCL’s takeover of 
Thomson Electronics Company also enabled the company to circumvent non-trade barriers on the 
importation of Chinese television sets into Europe. Additionally, the company was also able to benefit 
from the extensive market network that Thomson Electronics has established in Europe and North 
America (Deng, 2007: 76). 
 
Market access has been achieved through several strategies such as greenfield investments, joint 
ventures and through mergers and acquisitions. Examples of such investment include the acquisition 
of French Le Cabanon/ Conserves de Provence by the Chinese investor Chalkis who wanted to access 
its well- developed distribution network in the European market. (Nicolas, 2014:111). Other big 
Chinese firms such as Haier have localized their technologies, brand and production within Europe 
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in the hope that such a move will help them to expand their market share significantly (Child & 
Rodrigues, 2005:399). 
 
The nature of government policies in Europe  
Chinese FDI flows to Europe have also been attracted by the favorable government policies in the 
European countries. These favorable policies were used by certain European countries especially 
those from Central and Eastern Europe to attract Chinese FDI following the Chinese announcement 
of the ‘Go Global Policy’ in 1999. These policies took the form of tax-concessions, tariff abolition, 
the settlement of free economic zones and the avoidance of double taxation (Ebbers and Zhang, 2010: 
194) According to (Meunier, 2014), an increased need for the   European countries to attract Chinese 
FDI has emerged especially after the sovereign debt crisis. During this period, different countries in 
Europe have adopted a variety of policies in an effort to attract Chinese investments.  
 
According to Meunier (2014:295), several European countries have recently set up investment 
promotion agencies in China to encourage Chinese FDI in their own countries. These agencies are 
responsible for facilitating public relation campaigns to promote their respective countries and also 
offer administrative support to prospective investors. She gives examples of such agencies to include: 
‘Invest in France,’ ‘Germany Trade and Invest’ and the ‘UK Trade and Investment’ agencies, which 
all have physical presence in China. Additionally, in order to promote Chinese investment, some 
European countries like those in central and Eastern Europe offer preferential incentives like 
investment allowance or tax credits in selected sectors that adopt new technologies (Ebbers and 
Zhang, 2010:195). Other Incentives adopted by these countries has taken the form of financial 
incentives like bilateral tax agreements and tax concessions. Hungary, Poland, Czech Republic, 
Romania, Ukraine and Russia are examples of countries which have signed a Bilateral Tax Agreement 
with China (Ebbers and Zhang, 2010: 194). Furthermore, favorable citizenship rules have been 
implemented by a number of European countries’ governments especially those in sovereign debt 
crisis like Spain, Portugal and Greece. These countries have passed laws that grant non EU investors 
permanent residency in Europe provided they invest a required minimum amount which is set by the 
respective governments. These laws have taken a form of incentive which targets individuals rather 
than companies. Thus, the Chinese citizens have been a key target for this form of incentives. They 
have positively responded by investing in countries that can offer them a visa to stay and travel in 
Europe (Meunier, 2014:196). 
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Sovereign debt crisis as a disputed driving force  
The sovereign debt crisis that mainly hit southern European countries is also cited by some authors 
as attracting Chinese FDI in Europe. Generally, there is a consensus among scholars that the sovereign 
debt crisis has provided an additional reason for the Chinese companies to move to Europe (Nicolas, 
2014; Meunier, 2014). This arises from the fact that countries in sovereign debt crisis like Greece, 
Portugal, Ireland and Spain have been privatizing most of their state owned enterprises in the wake 
of the debt crisis (Palcic and Reeves, 2013). Three reasons have been posited by Meunier (2014:293) 
as contributing to Chinese FDI flows to the privatized public assets. First, Chinese investors, more so 
state owned enterprises, were at an advantageous position since they could easily access capital from 
their government. At the time of the crisis, China had accumulated the largest foreign exchange 
reserves which were estimated at $3.4trillion. Secondly, the 2008 financial crisis convinced China 
that it had to diversify its investments into a variety of ways given that it was the largest owner of 
U.S’ government debt. In addition, two thirds of its reserves were in dollar denominated assets which 
put China in a vulnerable position. As a result, China started investing away from the dollar to the 
euro and into different kinds of assets such as portfolio investments and FDI. Thirdly, China resorted 
to investing in real assets because they anticipated that these investments would generate higher 
returns than the ones they got from government bonds during the crisis.  
Despite some scholars supporting the view that Chinese FDI has increased in Europe in the wake of 
the sovereign debt crisis, they disagree on the extent to which it has influenced the flow of Chinese 
FDI to Europe. This group of scholars like Nicolas (2014) and Meunier (2014) do not see the crisis 
as a major driving force for Chinese FDI but rather argue that it can only be considered as a facilitating 
factor for the Chinese to invest in Europe. Nicolas (2014) for instance argues that the Chinese had 
been targeting financially distressed firms in Europe even before the sovereign debt crisis. Meunier 
(2014:284) on the other hand, points out that China’s accumulation of foreign reserves, the promoted 
‘go global’ policy and  the economic need to move up the value chain by acquiring foreign know-
how and technology would have still translated into an increased outward Chinese FDI. She therefore 
argues that the sovereign debt crisis led to an increased demand for Chinese FDI in the affected 
countries thus increasing the bargaining power for Chinese investors. Notwithstanding these 
differences, the sovereign debt crisis and the subsequent privatization in sovereign debt crisis 
countries has opened an opportunity for Chinese firms to invest in Europe.  
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Operationalization of the conceptual framework 
The pull factors discussed above will be used to analyze how Chinese FDI in Greece has responded 
after the sovereign debt crisis. We will specifically use the “access to markets in Europe”, “the nature 
of government policies in Europe” and the sovereign debt crisis. The pull factor, “availability of 
strategic assets in Europe” will be discussed in a different perspective than proposed in this 
framework.   
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4. Background and Reactions to the Sovereign Debt Crisis 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section will provide a background of the sovereign 
debt crisis in several countries in Europe by tracing it from the 2008 financial crisis that started in the 
United States. This section will also elaborate in detail how the sovereign debt crisis started in Greece 
by outlining the factors behind the crisis. On the other hand, the second section of this chapter will 
examine the reactions towards the crisis. Thus, this section aims at discussing how privatization has 
become a reaction from both European governments and other external financial institutions in the 
wake of the sovereign debt crisis. First, we will discuss overall reactions in Europe following the 
crisis. We afterward use the case of Greece to elucidate how privatization was adopted as part of the 
reactions within countries in sovereign debt crisis.  
4.1 Background to the sovereign debt crisis  
The 2007/2008 global financial crisis generated diverse economic problems in different countries 
across the globe. According to Helleiner (2011: 68-69), there had not been any crisis as severe as this 
one since the great depression of the 1930s. He argues that the intensity of the crisis can be understood 
best through its aftermaths where some of the world’s most popular financial institutions were either 
nationalized or collapsed. Additionally, he points out that the crisis led to the near collapse of 
international trade, a decline in remittances payments and an overall economic downturn that affected 
most parts of the world.  
Helleiner (2011:69) explains that the global financial crisis first originated in the United States after 
the bursting of a housing bubble. This was coupled with increased defaults of mortgages which had 
been availed to uncreditworthy borrowers.  According to his discussion, the mortgage defaults caused 
instability of major financial institution in the United States. This condition warranted state 
interventions through liquidity inputs as well as nationalization of some of the financial institutions. 
An example of a company that was nationalized by the U.S government was the American 
International Group (AIG). It was the world’s largest insurance company (Helleiner (2011:69). 
Unfortunately, the crisis transcended the U.S boundaries and affected other continents in the world, 
more so Europe.  The effects of the crisis were witnessed in some of the European financial 
institutions that had also invested in mortgage related financial products in the U.S market (Helleiner 
2011: 69).  Consequently, major European banks were also exposed to losses that were taking place 
in the United States (Lane, 2012:55).  As a result of the financial crisis, both the American and 
European banks were forced to pull back their international loans owing to the problems they were 
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facing at home. This according to Helleiner (2011), further deepened financial problems and resulted 
in debt crises in countries which relied heavily on borrowing from abroad.  
According to Lane (2012: 54-55), the global financial crisis in Europe prompted a major reassessment 
among investors concerning the hasty growth in credit as well as the huge external deficits. He argues 
that this resulted in a tightening of conditions for credit, a repatriation of funds back home by investors 
and a drying up of inter border financial flows. Lane (2012) extends his discussion by pointing out 
that the global financial crisis had dissimilar impacts on different European countries with respect to 
the intensity of its effects. According to him, countries that relied heavily on external funding were 
the hardest hit by the crisis and entered into deeper crisis. With decline in investments and difficulties 
in accessing credits, these countries increased their government debts which became difficult to 
finance, hence entering into sovereign debt crisis.  
We acknowledge that most European countries were adversely affected by the financial crisis, 
however, our discussion focuses only on European countries that experienced sovereign debt crisis 
as a consequence of the global financial crisis.  
According to Lane (2012), the European sovereign debt crisis was not a major concern in Europe 
until late 2009 when some countries reported larger than expected growths in fiscal deficit to Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) ratio. He gives examples of Ireland and Spain in which the fiscal revenue 
fell much more rapidly than their GDP. Additionally, he mentions that Greece also faced a high 
deficit, especially after the new elected 2009 government announced a forecast of more than double 
the previous estimate of deficit. At the same time, the spread of sovereign bonds was also increasing 
in countries like Italy, Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Greece (Lane, 2012: 56).  According to Zacune et 
al (2013), the government debt in such countries continued to increase over the following years. They 
state that “the highest ratios of debt to Gross Domestic Product in the third quarter of 2012 were 
recorded in Greece (153%), Italy (127%), Portugal (120%) and Ireland (117%) (Zacune et al, 2013:3). 
As Greece was the first country to experience the sovereign debt crisis, it offers a good insight into 
how the sovereign debt crisis started in Europe. In the years prior to the sovereign debt crisis, Greece 
was experiencing high growth rates. Dellas & Tavlas (2013:492) posit that from 2001 to 2008, the 
real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was increasing by 3.9 per cent each year and was the second 
highest in the Eurozone after Ireland. They further argue that the inflation rate averaged only 3.4 per 
cent over the same time period and thus Greece’s economy seemed to be moving in the right direction 
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until the financial crisis hit Greece in the end of 2009. High growth rates were replaced with recession 
and the size of the economy was projected to decrease by 23.5 % from 2007 to the end of 2013 
(Matsaganis, 2013:3). If we compare the GDP per capita in Greece to the western European average 
before and after the crisis, it becomes evident how severe the debt crisis impacted the living standards 
in Greece. In 2009, just before the debt crisis erupted, Greece was only 14.7 % below the European 
average. By 2013, this number had increased to 34.3 % below average (Matsaganis, 2013). How 
could this happen? And why did the financial crisis hit Greece so hard compared to other Eurozone 
countries? To answer this, we must first describe the origins of the Greek debt crisis.     
 
4.1.1 The origins of Greece’s Sovereign Debt Crisis 
The causes behind the debt crisis in Greece emanate from the economic sphere in Greece and within 
the Eurozone.  In the following section, we will keep our focus on the economic imbalances that 
Greece experienced after entering the Eurozone in 2001 and the specific events that triggered the 
sovereign debt crisis in Greece.   
 
Greece’s entry into the Eurozone in 2001 happened at a time when it was experiencing high growth 
rates. This was due to the decrease in nominal and interest rates that started in the year immediately 
prior to and immediately after joining the Eurozone (Dellas & Tavlas (2013:492). The low interest 
rates made it possible for Greece to borrow cheap credit to pay for government spending and imports. 
As a result, the government spending and the fiscal deficits increased substantially between 2001 and 
2009. Government spending rose by 9 percentage points to 54 % of GDP and fiscal deficits reached 
15.6 % of GDP, largely exceeding the limit of 3 % set by the EU in the “Stability and Growth Pact” 
(Dellas & Tavlas, 2013). These borrowed funds were used to pay for current consumption instead of 
investing them in production that could create new resources to pay back the debt. The EU was aware 
that the public debt in Greece was increasing at a fast pace, but besides giving Greece and other 
Eurozone countries reprimands nothing was done to turn the economy around (Nelson et. al. 2011).  
 
The fiscal deficit was one of the factors that widened Greece’s current account deficit. Both the 
private and public sector can influence the current account, but in the case of Greece, the widening 
of the deficit was purely caused by the increased expenditure of the public sector (Dellas & Tavlas, 
2013:497). The net public saving, as a percentage of GDP, decreased from minus 4 per cent in 2001 
to minus 15 percent in 2009 whereas the private net savings in Greece rose from minus 7 % to minus 
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1 % of GDP (Dellas & Tavlas, 2013). Another factor that also widened the current account deficit 
was Greece’s lack of competitiveness after entering the Eurozone in 2001. Dimitris Malliaropulos 
(2010) argues that Greece’s competitiveness declined 10 % from 2000 to 2010 in terms of relative 
prices and labor costs. Furthermore, according to the Ease of Doing Business Index of the World 
Bank, Greece is not among the 100 most competitive states in the world and was well below all the 
other EU states (World Bank, 2010). This lack of competitiveness certainly impacted Greece’s ability 
to create a surplus on the current account.   
 
The event that is accounted as the beginning of the crisis in Greece was when the socialist government 
(only few weeks after being elected) in the end of 2009 revealed that the earlier fiscal data had been 
misreported to the EU. The government revised the estimates for 2009 which led to an increase in the 
budget deficit from 3.7 % to 15.5 % of GDP and raised the public debt from 99.6 % to 129.4 % of 
GDP (Matsaganis, 2013:4). This announcement of misreporting raised concerns about the future of 
the Eurozone and Greece’s tenability to continue being part of it. As a result, the cost of borrowing 
started increasing at unprecedented levels which eventually led to Greece’s debt crisis (Matsaganis, 
2013:4).  
 
At this time, several countries in Europe were already feeling the effects of the global financial crisis. 
The crisis led to slump in many economies and further strained their public finances (Nelson et. al. 
2011). In Greece, the effects were especially severe because it was relying heavily on external 
borrowing. As argued by Lane (2012) above in this chapter, the crisis led investors to a reassess their 
loans to countries given the increasing growth in debts and deficits in some European countries. In 
Greece, investors were particularly concerned about the high government debt and thus they feared 
that the country would default on its loans (Nelson et. al. 2011). Additionally, the global financial 
crisis also impacted the Gulf Emirates, where the government in November 2009 asked its creditors 
for a six-month stance on its debt. This announcement surprised the international financial markets 
that became more reluctant in taking risks. This event also turned the attention of the financial 
institutions towards the high levels of debt in Greece (Dellas & Tavlas, 2013).   
 
As a result of these events, investors started to question whether the financial situation in Greece was 
sustainable and if Greece was able to pay its debt. This lack of confidence in the Greece economy 
resulted in higher interest rates on the loans to Greece. The higher interest rates could compensate the 
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investors for the increased risk that it entailed holding the Greek bonds. This development was 
especially evident in the widening of the spread of the Greek government bonds, which increased 
from 25-65 basis points in the spring and summer of 2008 to 586 basis points in April 2010 (Kouretas 
& Vlamis, 2010). The Greek government which had been relying on borrowing from international 
investors to pay for public spending, was now in a vulnerable financial situation as it could not keep 
borrowing money abroad at these high interest rates (Nelson et. al. 2011).   
 
The above mentioned events triggered Greece’s sovereign debt crisis and led to the high increase of 
the public debt. The rest of the European countries intervened in March, 2010 by providing loans and 
proposing several austerity measures to the Greek government (Kouretas and Vlamis, 2010:397). 
However, as argued by Kouretas and Vlamis (2010), the responses by the Eurozone governments 
were not quick and clear enough and were actually a contributing factor to the Greek crisis. While 
the crisis was intensifying, the Eurozone governments were discussing whether they wanted to and 
could, by the laws of the EU, support Greece. Nothing in the Maastricht Treaty prevents EU countries 
from helping each other in case of economic difficulties however this did not prevent the countries 
from discussing the matter – properly because of political reasons. Consequently, the markets 
assumed that the European countries would not help Greece and that there was no guarantee on the 
Greek debt, causing the government bonds to rise to obscure levels (Kouretas & Vlamis, 2010).   
Eventually, the intervention to the Greece sovereign debt crisis was done by the IMF, the European 
Central Bank and European Commission which implemented a bailout program in 2010 (Dellas & 
Tavlas,2013:500). The different responses to the Greek crisis will be described in the next section.   
 
4.2 Reactions to the sovereign debt crisis in Europe 
According to Lane (2012), Greece’s adoption of the euro as a currency meant that it could not devalue 
its currency in order to address the sovereign debt crisis. Currency devaluation is recognized as a 
mechanism used by governments to address budget and current account deficits (Nelson et al, 2010). 
Lane (2012:49) argues that this is because countries in the Eurozone are bound by condition that do 
not allow then to devalue the euro. Thus, the deteriorating economic condition in these countries 
warranted the intervention of other countries in the euro-zone as well as from other institutions like 
the IMF (Lane, 2012:49-58; Nelson, et al, 2010). Greece was the first country to officially request for 
international financial assistance in April 2010, followed by Ireland in November the same year and 
Portugal in April 2011 (Ferry et al, 2013: 53, - 90).  
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Nelson et al (2011) and Lane (2012) explain that in order to prevent further spread of the crisis beyond 
the countries with high government debts, the European Union leaders decided to form a temporary 
European Financial Stability Facility in 2010. The facility was responsible for providing financial 
assistance to European countries in sovereign debt crisis.  This facility was however replaced with a 
permanent lending facility called the European Stability Mechanism in 2011 (Nelson et al, 2011: 6; 
Lane, 2012:57-58). Additionally, Nelson et al (2011:6) note that the leaders in the European Union 
also consulted the International Monetary Fund for extra support. In response, the International 
Monetary Fund entered into a joint initiative with the European Commission and the European 
Central Bank in 2010-2011, to develop large scale financial assistance to European countries in 
sovereign debt crisis (Ferry et al, 2013: 5). These actors have since been called the “Troika of 
Lenders” by a number of authors (Zacune et al, 2013:7; Palcic & Reeves, 2013: 127; Matsaganis, 
2013:4). A major part of resources for lending from the Troika was provided by the European Union 
and the International Monetary Fund was a minority lender providing only a third of the financing 
(Ferry et al, 2013:107). 
An important aspect to consider as pointed out by writers like Nelson et al (2011), Zacune et al (2013), 
Ferry et al (2013) and Palcic and Reeves (2013), is the attachment of conditionalities to bailout 
programmes offered by these lending institutions. According to Ferry et al (2013:20), the original 
mission of the Troika indicated that disbursements of loans would be subject to strict conditionality 
and would require assessments from both the European commission and the European Central Bank. 
As a result, prescribed conditionalities were proposed by these lending institutions through a 
memorandum of understanding. These conditions had to be implemented if the countries wanted the 
loans. The conditions entailed a reduction of public expenditures with a motive of enhancing growth 
in their economies (Zacune et al, 2013:  8). Most importantly, privatization of state owned enterprises 
was a major condition from the lending institutions (Palcic and Reeves, 2013:122). Thus, various 
state assets ranging from transport, infrastructure, public water services, national banks, energy and 
even state buildings were targeted for privatization in these countries (Zacune et al, 2013:8).  In the 
next section, we intend to discuss in detail how privatization was part of the reactions by the Troika 
of lenders and governments in countries experiencing the sovereign debt crisis  
 4.2.1 Privatization as a reaction within European countries in sovereign debt crisis 
As discussed in the previous section, privatization of state owned enterprises was advanced by the 
Troika of lenders as a conditionality for loans in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis. In Ireland 
however, the government had made autonomous privatization decisions prior to its entry into Troika’s 
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support programs in 2010 (Palcic and Reeves 2013:122). This was as a result of the speedy decline 
of public funds after 2008 in Ireland which generated the need to consider new sources of income.  
Although Ireland showcases an instance of autonomous plans to privatize, the need for privatization 
was intensified after its entry to the Troika’s bailout packages which significantly altered the decision 
making context (Palcic and Reeves 2013:122).  
The IMF, the European Commission and the European Central bank have therefore been the most 
influential proponents for privatization of state owned enterprises in countries in sovereign debt crisis.  
As mentioned in the first chapter of this paper, this was not the first time that the IMF has been 
pushing for privatization in crisis affected countries. According to chapter one of Mosley et al (1995), 
privatization has been advanced by the IMF and the World Bank since the 1980s as part of their policy 
based lending mechanism. As discussed earlier, these institutions found it appropriate to adjust the 
economies of the developing countries after the economic crisis that affected most of these countries 
in the 1980s. Thus, as pointed out by Mosley et al (1995), these institutions availed loans to the 
developing countries to assist them in paying for their balance of payment deficits. However, the 
developing countries could only qualify for the loans on condition that they adopted policies that were 
favored by these two multilateral institutions. These institutions attributed the economic problems 
occurring in these countries to state led development policies. Consequently, they promoted the 
adoption of neo-liberal policies as conditions for loan qualifications. These scholars explain that the 
proposed policies, promoted the rolling back of the state from the management and ownership of 
various economic enterprises like the financial institutions, industries and marketing agencies. 
Further, the state was required to limit its regulatory activities in dissimilar areas like agriculture, 
trade and industry. The corrective measure for state’s intervention into economic processes was then 
seen to be privatization of state owned enterprises and extensive deregulation. This was proposed 
with a belief that it would enhance efficient use of scarce resources in the developing countries. Palcic 
and Reeves (2013: 122) point out that since then, privatization has persistently been advanced by 
these institutions as conditionality for financial support more so towards the low income countries. 
However, in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis, privatization has become part of the conditions for 
eligibility of loans to crisis affected countries like Portugal, Greece and Ireland.  
For example, since Ireland entered into the bailout programs, the Troika has taken a lead position in 
setting targets regarding the amount of revenue that the government should raise from privatization 
of assets as a condition for financial assistance (Palcic and Reeves, 2013:123). According to the IMF 
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September 2011 country report, the Irish government was required to reflect on a privatization 
programme that would generate a total of €5 billion (IMF 2011a :20). Additionally, the government 
was also required to present a proposal of potential assets targeted for disposal as well as a timeframe 
for the implementation of their privatization (IMF, 2011b: 69). The Troika has similarly pushed for 
privatization of state assets in Portugal. The Portuguese government was expected to achieve a target 
of €5 billion by the end of the privatization programme and therefore outlined various sectors for 
privatization (European Commission, 2012:60). These sectors included postal services, the media and 
the health insurance system. In the same light, the Troika has also been very influential in the 
advancement of privatization policies in Greece. According to Palcic and Reeves, this has been 
enhanced through the memorandum of understanding that the Troika lenders have had with the Greek 
government (Palcic and Reeves, 2013: 126). The specific trends in the push for privatization in Greece 
will be discussed in details in the next section. 
4.2.2 Reaction to the sovereign debt crisis in Greece  
Greece’s reaction to the sovereign debt crisis took a two pronged approach. The first one was at the 
domestic level where the government announced and implemented a number of austerity measures 
aimed at minimizing the budget deficit. The second approach was at the external level and 
encompassed the government attempts to seek for a bail out in order to avert a default on its sovereign 
debts. This latter approach was mainly dominated by the joint activities of the International Monetary 
Fund, the European Commission and the European Central Bank. This section will thus analyze these 
approaches with a focus on how they have led to the privatization of public assets and measures that 
were taken to attract FDI.  
 Reactions by Greece’s government    
One of the earliest reactions to the crisis by the Greek government can best be seen through the Greek 
Stability and Growth Programme which was submitted to the European Commission on 15th January 
2010 (Kouretas & Vlamis, 2010: 397). One of the many actions that Greece committed to undertake 
under that programme, was the privatization of public assets in order to reduce the public debt. Hence, 
Greece committed to reduce or eliminate government control in most economic activities outside 
public goods while still having a continued stake holding in sectors that were of strategic importance 
in terms of public interest and national security. Sectors that were deemed of strategic importance 
included the banking sector and key infrastructure assets such as airports, ports, water companies and 
power companies amongst others (Ministry of Finance, 2010:51). This privatization was further 
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complemented by the proposal to establish supervisory bodies that would play a part in ensuring 
economic efficiency. The government anticipated that this policy of privatization and restructuring 
would raise 2.5 billion in 2010 with projected increases in subsequent years (Ministry of Finance, 
2010:51).  The plan further envisaged that privatization measures would start in January 2010 and 
continue up to 2012. It’s also worth mentioning that the plan proposed four degrees of ownership. 
The first was full privatization that would be done to assets that were not related to public goods and 
those that fell outside the state’s strategic interests. The second form of ownership was ‘a blocking 
minority state ownership’ where the state owned 34% of the public asset. The third was ‘a minority 
state ownership’ where the state had less than 34% ownership. The last form of ownership was a 
majority state ownership where the state had at least 51% ownership. This last form of ownership 
was for a limited number of public assets that offered public goods and security (Ministry of Finance, 
2010:52).  
 
In addition to the privatization of public assets, the government also committed to reform investment 
regulations in order to spur private investments and FDI.  Under this proposal, the government 
promised to ‘radically simplify procedures for starting, licensing and operating a business in the 
country’ (Ministry of Finance, 2010:45). By the time the Greek government was sending this 
programme to the European Commission, they had already announced and initiated a number of 
regulatory reforms that aimed at making it easy for firms to register and operate businesses. Other 
reforms included the adoption of ICT in administrative processes, and the establishment of regional 
one-stop shops that were to support entrepreneurs especially the Small and Medium Enterprises 
(Ministry of Finance, 2010:45).   
In order to coordinate the massive privatization process of selected public assets and minimize 
political interference, the Greek government also established a privatization fund known as the 
Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund (HRADF) on 1st of July 2011. So far, it is the largest 
declared divestment programme in the world. The fund aims at restricting government intervention 
in the privatization process while at the same time ensuring the privatization process is done in a 
professional manner13. Although the Greek government is the sole shareholder of the fund with a 
share capital of €30 billion, it operates as a limited company that is governed by private law. Since 
its establishment, most assets earmarked for privatization have been transferred to the fund. Once 
                                                          
13The Fund (n.d) www.hradf.com retrieved on 22nd November 2014 from http://www.hradf.com/en/the-fund    
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transferred, such assets cannot revert back to the state. Public assets under the fund are categorized 
into three groups namely 1. Real estate, 2. Company shares and 3. Rights14. 
 
The management of the fund is also clearly defined. The Board of Directors and the Chief Executive 
Officer play very prominent roles in the privatization process.  The Board of Directors is made up of 
five members and two observers without voting rights- one from the Eurozone and the other from the 
European Commission. The Board of Directors is solely responsible in making privatization decisions 
upon receiving such information from the Chief Executive Officer. The Chief Executive Officer is 
responsible for the operations of the fund. In spite of the Board of Directors having the final say in 
the privatization process, they are mandated to take into account the non-binding opinion of a Council 
of Experts. This Council of Experts is made up of seven members with broad experience and strong 
academic qualifications. Four members are appointed by the Board of directors while the remaining 
three are appointed by the Troika. Besides the Council of Experts, the Board of Directors also have 
to take into consideration the opinion of an independent evaluator. On average, a single privatization 
process may take between nine to fifteen months15.     
 
In addition, the Fund operates a very active website (http://www.hradf.com/en) where it uploads all 
the relevant news, reports and progresses made. In its Asset Development Plan progress report of 
June 2014, the Fund reported that 32 privatizations had either been completed or were in track, more 
than 80,000 properties had been assessed and more than 3000 properties had been pre-selected for 
development. The report further added that it had transacted a total value of €4.9 billion out of which 
€2.9 billion was already in government coffers (Hellenic Republic Asset Development Fund, 2014).  
 
International responses to Greece’s sovereign debt crisis 
The Troika of lenders have also played an immense role in the Greece sovereign debt crisis. Although 
the international response is currently active in helping Greece address the sovereign debt crisis, this 
help came in late and has actually been pointed out as being one of the exogenous factors behind the 
sovereign debt crisis (Kouretas & Vlamis, 2010: 396). The delay of the international response was 
due to a number of reasons such as the perceived illegality of such a bailout by some European Union 
countries led by Germany, lack of solidarity funds at the European Union level and the lack of a clear 
                                                          
14 ibid 
15 ibid 
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indication by Eurozone governments on their willingness to help Greece (Kouretas & Vlamis, 2010: 
396; Matsaganis, 2013:4). 
 
Despite the delay, the Troika and the Greek government have since implemented a number of 
international rescue plans though the first major bail out took place in May 2010. Under this bailout, 
the European Union and the IMF provided €110 billion. Prior to the May 2010 bail out, the European 
Union and the IMF had on the 25th of March 2010 agreed to the first rescue plan where Greece could 
access bilateral loans from fellow European Union countries and loans from the International 
Monetary Fund at below market rates (Kouretas & Vlamis, 2010: 397). It was a €45 billion rescue 
plan where three thirds of the loans would come from European Union countries bilateral loans and 
the rest would come from International Monetary Fund loans. This plan was accompanied by the 
implementation of several austerity measures but they nonetheless proved to be inadequate. It is 
against this background that the Greek government formally turned to the European Union and the 
International Monetary Fund and requested for the activation of a rescue mechanism on 23rd April 
2010 (Argyrou &Tsoukalas, 2011: 175). This thus resulted in the May 2010 €110 billion bailout that 
is mentioned above. Under this bail out, Eurozone countries provided €80 billion while the 
International Monetary Fund provided €30 billion (IMF, 2010).  Since then, there have been periodic 
reviews of the austerity measures being implemented and revisions on targets and conditions. The 
IMF has particularly done the monitoring through quarterly reviews (IMF, 2010)   
A key feature of all the rescue plans has been the requirement that Greece implement austerity 
measures that are meant at reducing its public debt. Out of those conditions, privatization of public 
assets has emerged as a major policy that Greece needs to implement.  
In Greece, the privatization conditions were contained in the several Memorandum of Understanding 
agreements that Greece assented to in order to receive the bailout packages. For example, in the first 
Memorandum of Understanding of August 2010, Greece committed to reforming and privatizing 
several state owned companies. It also agreed to develop a detailed privatization plan that contained 
timelines and projected revenues from the sale of public assets. Additional memorandum of 
understanding agreements of December 2010 and February 2011 further expanded the list of public 
assets to be privatized and adjusted the projected revenues (Palcic & Reeves, 2013: 126). The main 
rationale for privatization is that it will reduce the public debt, increase the efficiency and 
productiveness of the companies, support the economic recovery and long term growth of Greece, 
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improve the market sentiment over time, encourage foreign direct investments and other private 
investments and finally support Greece’s return to the bond markets.16  
Revenue projections from the sale of public assets have kept on being adjusted with each passing 
memorandum of understanding but the targets have hardly ever been met. This has been due to an 
unstable political environment and poor economic performance that have reduced investor confidence 
(Zacune et al, 2013: 9) Red tape and out right resistance have also been cited at being other reasons17. 
For example, the first privatization plan anticipated to raise €7 billion by 2013 but was later revised 
to €15 billion by 2015. This figure was later revised in 2011 following the second bail out in July 
2011 where the Greek government committed to raise €50billion by 2015. This latter projection was 
however deemed to be highly ambitious and subsequently revised downwards in March 2012 to €14 
billion by 2014. However, in December 2012, the Troika were pessimistic about this projections 
following their announcement that Greece would only be able to raise €8.5 billion by the end of 2016.  
4.3 Chapter conclusion 
The 2008 global financial crisis that started in the United States led to a reduction in investments and 
limited the availability of external sources of funding. This immensely affected European countries 
that relied on external borrowing and contributed to sovereign debt crisis in several countries. The 
years following the sovereign debt crisis in Europe witnessed several reactions from dissimilar actors 
as a response to the crisis. The initial responses emanated from the efforts of the European Union but 
joint initiatives with the IMF were later necessary. The push for privatization of state owned 
enterprises in crisis affected countries became a major reaction in this period. Although some 
countries such as Greece and Ireland expressed an interest in privatizing state assets, the need for 
privatization was intensified through the bailout programmes by international organizations such as 
the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
16Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission acting on behalf of the Euro Area Member 
States, and the Hellenic Republic (n.d). http://ec.europa.eu retrieved on 22nd November 2014 from   
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/eu_borrower/mou/2012-03-01-greece-mou_en.pdf                                                                                         
17Smith, H. (2013, March 10) Greek reforms hit new setback as privatisation chief resigns. The Guardian Newspaper 
retrieved in 20th November 2014 from http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/10/greek-reforms-setback-
privatisation-chief-resigns  
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5. Chinese FDI in Europe in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis 
This chapter is divided into two broad sections. In the first section we analyze the flow of Chinese 
FDI into the entire European region in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis. Additionally, we seek to 
examine how Chinese FDI has changed within the European countries in sovereign debt crisis from 
2008 to June 2014. The section further provides an analysis of the sector division of Chinese FDI 
both in the sovereign debt crisis countries and in overall Europe.  In the second section of this chapter, 
we use the case of Greece to analyze the extent to which privatization of state owned enterprises 
during the sovereign debt crisis has influenced the flow of Chinese FDI. We seek to conduct this 
analysis by examining the flows of Chinese FDI in the infrastructure and real estate sectors in Greece. 
Thereafter, we analyze other driving forces behind Chinese investments in the wake of the sovereign 
debt crisis. 
 
5.1 Chinese FDI in overall Europe and the sovereign debt crisis countries  
As argued by Lane (2012) in chapter 3, the financial crisis in Europe affected investors’ willingness 
to lend money, resulting in a retraction of money and fewer financial flows across borders. This inter 
alia affected the financial flows from China to Europe. Data from the Heritage Foundation, illustrated 
in figure 1 below, demonstrates that Chinese FDI in Europe dropped 18.8 % from 2008 to 2009 and 
further 18.6 % from 2009-2010.  
There is a dissimilarity between the data from the Heritage Foundation and from Eurostat about when 
the financial crisis impacted Chinese FDI flows to Europe. According to Eurostat, Chinese FDI in 
Europe was already decreasing when the global financial crisis hit the US in 2007 and continued to 
stay extremely low during 2008 and 2009, before slightly increasing in 201018. Following Lane’s 
(2012) arguments above, we posit that the drastic declines in Chinese FDI during the financial crisis 
in Europe, could have affected the Chinese investors’ trust in the European market resulting in a 
retraction of investments. Even though the impacts of the financial crisis were not severely felt on the 
Chinese economy, as the case was in Europe and America, we argue that the Chinese investors could 
have been forced to reconsider their investments in the European region at that time (Li et al, 2012).  
Both datasets show that Chinese FDI in Europe only declined for 2 years before the trend turned. 
According to Eurostat, it declined in 2008 and 2009 and according to Heritage Foundation it declined 
                                                          
18 Eurostat (2012, June 13): EU27 investment flows with the rest of the world recovered in 2011. Eurostat.com. 
Retrieved on the 18th of December 2014 at www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STAT-12-88_en.pdf     
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in 2009 and 2010. Additionally, both data sets illustrate that Chinese FDI increased significantly from 
2010 to 2011, reaching a higher level than before the financial crisis started. Based on this, we argue 
that this large increase in Chinese FDI in 2011 could indicate that the Chinese investors got a renewed 
belief in the European market.  
 
Figure 1: Chinese FDI in overall Europe and the sovereign debt crisis countries from 2008- June 2014 (in $ million) 
 
Source: own analysis formulated from China Global Investments Tracker 2014 by Heritage Foundation  
 
The financial crisis in Europe had very different impacts on the European countries. As explained in 
chapter 4, the countries which relied on external funding were the worst hit and experienced a 
sovereign debt crisis. These countries included Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy, which will 
be examined as the sovereign debt crisis countries in the following section. It is important to note that 
the China Global Investment Tracker did not report any data on Ireland, so the following analysis on 
the sovereign debt crisis countries will be without Ireland.  
 
As illustrated in figure 1 above, the sovereign debt crisis countries experienced a drastic decrease of 
79.21 % of Chinese investments from 2008-2009. This was followed by a small increase from 2009-
2010 and finally a drastic increase of 227 % from 2010 to 2011 (figure 1). What is worth noticing 
about these figures is that the variance from 2008 to 2009 and from 2010 to 2011 is considerably 
larger than the European figures. We attribute two reasons for this. First of all, as these sovereign 
debt crisis countries were most severely hit, the Chinese investors could have had larger doubts about 
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the stability in these specific countries compared to other European countries. The result was a large 
decrease in Chinese FDI in these countries in 2009. The second reason for these variances in the 
Chinese FDI in the sovereign debt crisis countries can be the fact that a smaller data set is more 
sensitive towards changes. As a result, one single large investment can cause significant changes and 
therefore create large variances in the Chinese FDI flows to Europe. For example, the large 
investment in Energias de Portugal by Three Gorges in 2011, caused the Chinese FDI in sovereign 
debt crisis countries to increase drastically from 2010 to 2011, even though this was almost the only 
investment in 2011 (Figure 1 and appendix 1).      
Another important difference between Chinese FDI in Europe and in the sovereign debt crisis 
countries is that there has been Chinese FDI in Europe since 2005 whereas the Chinese investors 
didn’t invest in the sovereign debt countries before 2008 (Appendix 1 and 2). This aspect will be 
discussed in the case of Greece in the next part of this chapter. Besides this exception, Chinese flows 
to sovereign debt crisis countries follow the flows of overall Europe with large investment flows in 
2008, 2011 and 2014. The large increase in 2011 by Chinese investors in the sovereign debt crisis 
countries brings out some interesting aspects, as these countries were still in a sovereign debt crisis 
in 2011. So what caused Chinese FDI to increase so drastic in 2011?   
 
One causal explanation could be that the European Union entered into a joint initiative with the IMF 
in 2010-2011 to offer fiscal assistance to countries in sovereign debt crisis (Ferry et al, 2013:107). As 
described in chapter 4, the key element in these bail-out programs, was privatization of public assets. 
As a result, the sovereign debt crisis countries have been privatizing their public assets in order to 
receive the bail-out package from the European Union and the IMF and to attract foreign investments.   
In order to understand whether the Chinese FDI flows reacted to the privatization of public assets in 
the sovereign debt crisis countries, we must first analyze which sectors the Chinese investors are 
targeting in the sovereign debt crisis countries and how these differ from the sectors that the Chinese 
are targeting in overall Europe.  
 
According to data from the Heritage Foundation, illustrated in figure 2, the energy sector received 
most Chinese FDI in overall Europe and countries in sovereign debt crisis from 2009 to June 2014. 
In this regard, the countries in sovereign debt crisis are following the trend of Europe. However in 
the rest of the sectors reported, there are large and interesting differences. First of all, whereas the 
transport and real estate sectors receive large amounts of Chinese FDI in Europe, these sectors receive 
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a small amount in the sovereign debt crisis countries. Actually, as illustrated in figure 2, the 
technology sector in the sovereign debt crisis countries receives a substantial larger amount of 
Chinese FDI than the real estate and finance sector. The Chinese investments in the technology sector 
in the sovereign debt crisis countries accounts for a massive 47.1% of all Chinese investments in the 
technology sector in Europe (appendix 4). Second of all, in the sovereign debt crisis countries there 
is no Chinese FDI in the agriculture, chemical or metal sector.  
 
Figure 2: Chinese investments and contracts by sector in Europe and the sovereign debt countries in $ million 
 
Source: own analysis formulated from China Global Investments Tracker 2014 by Heritage Foundation  
 
If we look further into Chinese FDI in the sovereign debt crisis countries we start to see a pattern. In 
Portugal, Chinese FDI is in the energy and finance sector, in Italy it is in all the sectors reported 
besides finance, in Greece it is in transport, real estate and consumer goods and in Spain it is in real 
estate and technology (Appendix 1). So even though they are all in a sovereign debt crisis the Chinese 
investors don’t engage in FDI in the same sectors in these countries.  However, a common 
characteristic can still be attributed to these sectors through a further analysis.  A review of different 
sources (Muenier, 2014; and Zacune et al, 2013) indicate that most of these sectors are being 
privatized after the sovereign debt crisis. Zacune (2013) points out that such sectors include energy, 
transport and water among others. According to Sanderson (2014), China’s state Grid Company for 
example bought a 35% stake in CDP Reti which is a subsidiary of Italy’s state financing agency 
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controlling the country’s energy sector19. As mentioned in chapter one, the purchase of a 21% stake 
in the Portugal’s Energias de Portugal Company by the China Three Gorges Corporation was also 
one of the biggest Chinese investment in Portugal after the sovereign debt crisis. Similarly, the largest 
Chinese investment in Greece as will be discussed in the next section, have been in the transport 
sector. These sector flows of Chinese investments in sovereign debt crisis countries indicate that some 
investments have been channeled to privatized state owned assets. From this, we can argue that 
privatization of these assets could have played a role in attracting Chinese FDI in countries in 
sovereign debt crisis. In order to reach a further conclusion on this aspect, we will analyze the case 
of Greece in the next section.  
 
5.2 Chinese FDI in Greece in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis 
According to data from the China Global Investment Tracker from 2005 to 2014, Chinese FDI in 
Greece was first recorded in 2008 (Appendix 3). The lack of Chinese investments in Greece’s public 
assets before 2008 can be attributed to two main reasons as captured by Psaraftis & Pallis (2012: 31). 
First, the Greek government was the main investor in public assets and thus left little room for foreign 
investors. Secondly, trade unions had strong influence on whether foreign investors could invest in 
public assets. These trade unions feared that foreign investments in public assets would lead to loss 
of jobs, poor working standards and reduction in wages. For example, in 2004, the Greek government 
tried to reform the management of ports by giving concessions to foreign investors. However, this 
intention was largely undermined by militant port unions (Psaraftis & Pallis, 2012: 31). 
 
                                                          
19 Sanderson, R (2014) China Swoops in on Italy’s power grids and luxury brands: EU debt crisis opened up periphery 
countries to Chinese investors. Financial Times 7/10/2014. Retrieved on 23rd November 2014 from:  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1bd60160-4496-11e4-bce8-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3MDdaITTL 
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Figure 3: Chinese FDI in Greece between 2008 and 2014 
 
Source: own analysis formulated from China Global Investments Tracker 2014 by Heritage Foundation  
 
As indicated in figure 3 above, there was a large Chinese investment in 2008. It is important to note 
that this figure reflects only a single investment by the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO), 
which was given a concession in port of Piraeus20 . Although this investment began before Greece 
started experiencing sovereign debt crisis, the deal was concluded in 2009, at a time when the Greece 
economy was becoming uncompetitive and thus in need of foreign investments (Psaraftis and Pallis, 
2012). These scholars outline two reasons why the Greek government offered COSCO the concession 
over the port of Piraeus. The first was the need to develop the infrastructure of the port in order to 
make it more competitive in the region and thus attract more business. Low productivity levels, 
serious shortcomings in infrastructure such as lack of modern transshipment installations and absence 
of inland infrastructures like in-port rail stations had undermined competitiveness. As a result, the 
port had failed to take advantage of the booming maritime freight trade that existed prior to the 2008 
financial crisis despite its strategic location. The Greek government thus required that foreign 
investors could only qualify for a concession if they were able to invest more than €400 million in 
the improvement of infrastructure. The second reason was the need to overcome Greece’s public 
administration deficiencies at a time when public investments had stagnated due to the financial crisis. 
                                                          
20 China global investment tracker 2014. (2014) The Heritage Foundation retrieved on 20th November 2014 from 
http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map 
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For example, the Piraeus Port Authority had estimated that the operational cost of inefficiencies was 
40 % over the standard costs of competitive ports located in the region (Psaraftis & Pallis, 2012: 34). 
After the large investment by COSCO in 2008, there were no recorded investments in 2009. The 
investments started again in 2010 and there have been several investments since (see figure 3). We 
seek to understand to what extent the sovereign debt crisis has contributed to the investments after 
2008. In order to best understand Chinese FDI in Greece after the sovereign debt crisis, we seek to 
analyze the extent to which privatization has been a driving force for Chinese FDI in the different 
sectors in Greece.  
5.2.1 Privatization- A driving force or a facilitating factor?   
This section intends to analyze if privatization in Greece in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis is a 
driving force or a facilitating factor for Chinese FDI. We will provide an analysis of this aspect by 
examining Chinese FDI in Greece by sectors.  
The largest part of Chinese FDI in Greece after the sovereign debt crisis has been directed to the 
Greece infrastructure sector. A considerable amount has however been channeled to the real estate 
sector and other sectors in the years following the sovereign debt crisis (see figure 4). As figure 4 
illustrates, 72 % of the total investments in this period were channeled to the infrastructure sector, 15 
% to the real estate sector and only 13 % to other. In the case of Greece, “other” indicates consumer 
goods (Appendix 3). 
Figure 4: Chinese FDI in Greece by Sectors after the Sovereign Debt Crisis (in $ millions) 
 
Source: own analysis formulated from China Global Investments Tracker 2014 by Heritage Foundation  
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The amount of Chinese FDI flows into these sectors, could have been higher than what is captured in 
figure 4 above. The reason is that the China Global Investment Tracker from Heritage Foundation 
does not capture transaction under a $100 million dollars. A more detailed analysis of the 
infrastructure and real estate sectors is provided in the next section, because these are the sectors that 
attract the most Chinese FDI.  
 
Chinese investments in Greece’s infrastructure sector 
As illustrated in figure 4, Greece’s infrastructure sector has received the largest amount of Chinese 
FDI following the sovereign debt crisis. The big investments in the infrastructure sector can be 
attributed to privatization measures that the Greek government is currently implementing as a reaction 
to the sovereign debt crisis (see also chapter 4). For example, the port of Piraeus has emerged as one 
of the state assets listed for privatization by the Greek government. As discussed in above, a part of 
the port was already under concession from 2008. However, the formal process of privatizing Piraeus 
was not launched until 7th March 201421. Under this privatization plan, Greece’s privatization fund 
intends to sell 67 percent of share capital to private investors. COSCO has emerged as a key contender 
amongst six investment groups that have submitted their expressions of interest22.   
COSCO has also continued to consolidate its position as a key investor in Greece through further 
investments in the port. For instance, in September 2013, COSCO signed an agreement with the 
Greek government to expand the port by creating a fourth pier in the terminal. COSCO is thus 
expected to invest €230 million with a guarantee of an annual turnover of 4.75 million containers 
passing through the port23. In exchange, it would cease paying the fixed guaranteed fees to the Piraeus 
Port Authority until Greece’s Gross Domestic Product returned to its pre-crisis levels24.  This 
agreement was approved by the Competition Commission and the Internal Control Commission of 
                                                          
21 Glass, D. (2014, 13 March). Long-awaited Privatisation of Piraeus Port gets underway. Seatrade Global, Europe, 
retrieved on 24th November 2014 from http://www.seatrade-global.com/news/europe/long-awaited-privatisation-of-
pireaus-port-gets-underway.html  
22 Yallouros, L. (2014, 29 April). Piraeus Port Privatization Attracts Major Interest. Independent Balkan News Agency 
retrieved 24th November 2014from  http://www.balkaneu.com/piraeus-port-privatization-attracts-major-interest/  
23 Ellyatt, H. (2013, 26 November). Greek port deal paves way for privatization: Minister. CNBC retrieved 24th 
November 2014 at  http://www.cnbc.com/id/101228123  
24 Papachristou, H. (2013, 2 September). Piraeus investment deal eases privatization prospects. Reuters retrieved 24th 
November 2014 at  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/09/02/us-greece-china-piraeus-idUKBRE98109Q20130902  
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the European Union in July 201425. As a result, it has been the single biggest foreign direct investment 
since the crisis26.  
Chinese investors have also expressed an interest in investing in other infrastructure projects like 
airports, selected for privatization. For example, in March 2014, two Chinese companies- Friedmann 
Pacific Asset Management and Shenzhen Airport Group Company, jointly expressed an interest to 
buy a 55 percent stake in Athens Airport even before the formal process of privatization had started27. 
The stated Chinese motivations for this investments is to transform the airport into an international 
transit hub and facilitate the entry of Chinese travelers into Europe. Another Chinese interest in 
Greece’s infrastructure sector concerns China’s State Construction Engineering Corporation interest 
in the building of a €800 million airport in Crete Island. The winning firm in the construction of the 
airport will have a 35 year concession of the airport28.    
Chinese investments in Greece’s real estate sector 
According to figure 4 above, Greece’s real estate sector is the second largest receiver of Chinese FDI 
after the infrastructure sector. Data provided by the Heritage foundation indicate that there was no 
recorded Chinese investment in Greece’s real estate sector prior to 201029. This sector has however 
been one of the targeted potential sectors for raising capital through privatization in the wake of the 
sovereign debt crisis. Cole (2014) points out that the Greece’s Hellenic Republic Asset Development 
Fund (HRADF) privatization agency, has been under pressure to meet its target from the sale of state 
owned real estate assets30. The Troika for instance, proposed a transfer of state owned real estate 
assets to a holding company that would be managed by the European Union, with an aim of making 
                                                          
25Loannou, T. (2014, 22 July). European Commission greenlights COSCO Piraeus investment. The Times of 
Change. Retrieved 27th November 2014 from  http://www.thetoc.gr/eng/economy/article/european-
commission-greenlights-cosco-piraeus-investment  
26 Ellyatt, H. (2013, 26 November). Greek port deal paves way for privatization: Minister. CNBC retrieved 
24th November 2014 at  http://www.cnbc.com/id/101228123 
27Zarkadoula, E. (2014, 13 March).  Chinese investors eye buying Athens International Airport. China Central 
Television. Retrieved 23rd November 2014 from 
http://english.cntv.cn/program/bizasia/20140313/103823.shtml  
28 Koutantou, A. (2014, 18 June). INTERVIEW-Greece seeks bidders for $1 billion Crete airport. Reuters retrieved 26th 
November 2014 from http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/18/greece-infrastructure-idUKL5N0OX3V420140618  
29 The Heritage Foundation (2014) China global investment tracker. Available 20th November 2014 at : 
http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map 
30 Cole, M (2014) China's Fosun Buys Into Bottom of Greek Market With $1.26B Real Estate Deal. Forbes magazine 
3/30/2014. Available 24th November 2014 at:  http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelcole/2014/03/30/chinas-fosun-
buys-into-bottom-of-greek-real-estate-with-1-26b-deal/ 
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these properties more attractive for investors31. Owing to increased pressure of raising capital from 
this sector, Emott (2013) argues that a possible sale of 81,000 real estate properties with an estimated 
value of € 28 billion had been proposed in Athens by 201332. Since the government has been disposing 
these assets at very cheap prices, there has been a decline in the value of prime real estate assets in 
Greece33. The Chinese investors on the other hand, have seized this opportunity in Greece through 
their interest in various assets that have been listed for privatization.  
In June 2010 for example, the Greek Helios plaza signed a $123 million contract with the Beijing 
Construction Engineering Group (B.C.E.G); a Chinese real estate company, to construct a hotel and 
a shopping complex in Piraeus34.The Fosun International, another Chinese company has also 
capitalized on the privatization taking place in Greece and specifically on the depressed real estate 
prices.  According to Cole (2014), Fosun international partnered with Lamda development which is 
a Greek real estate company, and Abu Dhabi’s Al Maabar company to acquire the former Athen’s 
Hellenic port. This port was a high value piece of main seaside, which had been set for privatization 
by the Greek government. Surprisingly, the Fosun group was the only bidder for this property to 
which they paid €915 Million35.  
This case of Fosun group showcases how privatization of assets after the sovereign debt crisis has 
been a facilitating factor for Chinese FDI in Greece’s real estate sector. Fosun’s investment in the 
Greece real estate sector was its second major investment in Greece36. For example, the company is 
also the second largest shareholder of Greek fashion retailer Folli Follie in which it acquired a 9.5% 
                                                          
31 Emott, R. (2013) Euro zone, IMF to press Greece for foreign agency to sell assets. Reuters 29/8/2013. Retrieved on 
24th November at 2014: http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/29/us-eurozone-greece-privatisation-
idUSBRE97S0EJ20130829 
32 Ibid.  
33 Alderman, L (2012) Privatising Greece slowly but surely.  The New York Times 17/11/2012. Retrieved on 27th 
November 2014  at: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/business/privatizing-greece-slowly-but-not-
surely.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
34 Pham, M.A (2010) Chinese buys Greek when no one else will. Fortune magazine-June 18th 2010.Retrieved on 24th 
November 2014 at : 
http://archive.fortune.com/2010/06/18/news/international/China_investments_Greece.fortune/index.htm 
35 Cole, M (2014) China's Fosun Buys Into Bottom of Greek Market With $1.26B Real Estate Deal. Forbes magazine 
(3/30/2014). Retrieved on 24th November 2014  at:  http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelcole/2014/03/30/chinas-
fosun-buys-into-bottom-of-greek-real-estate-with-1-26b-deal/ 
36 China global investment tracker 2014. (2014) The Heritage Foundation retrieved on 20th November 2014 from 
http://www.heritage.org/research/projects/china-global-investment-tracker-interactive-map 
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stake for €84.59 million in May 201137. However, this company had not yet ventured into the Greek 
real estate sector. The depreciating prices of assets in the real estate sector of Greece and the lack of 
potential competitors for their acquisition can be seen as a major impetus for this company to invest 
in the real estate for the first time.  One could therefore argue that the privatization of the former 
Athens’ Hellenic port and the limited bidding competition for the property inspired the Fosun group 
to purchase the port.  
From the analysis of the sectors above, we argue that privatization has been a facilitating factor for 
Chinese FDI in Greece after the sovereign debt crisis. The privatization of public assets has created 
opportunities for Chinese investors. As a result, they have diversified their investments into other 
sectors as seen by the cases of COSCO and Fosun International. In the next section, we will analyse 
what other factors are driving Chinese investors to Greece after the sovereign debt crisis.  
5.3 Other pull factors behind Chinese FDI in Greece after the sovereign debt crisis  
This section intends to analyze if there could be other pull factors that are driving the Chinese 
investors to Greece after the sovereign debt crisis. We will structure our analysis based on our 
conceptual framework.  First, we will analyze how the Chinese companies are investing in Greece in 
order to access markets. Secondly, we will provide an analysis of how Greece’s government policies 
in the form of incentives can have acted as pull factors for Chinese FDI after the sovereign debt crisis.  
5.3.1 Access to European markets as a pull factor 
The desire to access the European market has emerged as a key driving force behind Chinese 
investments in Greece. Greece’s need for foreign investments and the privatization of public assets 
especially in the infrastructure sector has thus opened up an opportunity for the Chinese companies 
to invest in the country. This is because it guarantees them access to markets in the European Union 
and the Mediterranean region.  Chinese investors’ motivation to access the European market is well 
captured by the words of COSCO’s managing director Captain Fu Cheng Qiu in an interview with 
the Guardian newspaper in June 2014:  
                                                          
37 Cole, M (2014) China's Fosun Buys Into Bottom of Greek Market With $1.26B Real Estate Deal. Forbes magazine 
(3/30/2014). Available 24th November 2014 at:  http://www.forbes.com/sites/michaelcole/2014/03/30/chinas-fosun-
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“No other country in Europe offers such potential. We believe that Piraeus can be the biggest port in 
the Mediterranean and one of the most important distribution centres because it is the gateway to the 
Balkans and southern Europe.”38 
The location of the port is indeed strategic as it is located at the crossroad of Europe, Asia and Africa 
and thus has the potential of being an important entry point for products from China into Europe. 
COSCO’s activities in the port since 2009 have thus been geared towards attracting major companies 
that export their products from China to Europe. As a result, companies such as Hewlett-Packard 
Company, Huawei Technologies and ZTE Corporation are using Piraeus as a distribution center of 
their goods to Europe39.  The case of Hewlett-Packard Company offers a very good example of how 
the port is strategically located as the company uses the port as a quick gateway to   countries such as 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria and countries in the Balkan region (Putten, 
2014:15).  
China’s need to access markets has further seen the port of Piraeus being a key component of China’s 
plans to reform and strengthen its economy. China is implementing an ambitious plan that will link 
its economy with other trading regions by investing massively in infrastructure. The plan known as 
the “The New Silk Road Economic Belt” and the “21st Century Maritime Silk Road” 40, is a two 
pronged approach that seeks to connect Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East and lately Europe 
through a network of ports, logistics centers and railways. This is in order to ensure the quick and 
efficient distribution of Chinese products globally (Lin, 2011: 10). It has been modelled along the 
traditional Silk Road where ancient China had established trading routes with countries spanning 
Central Asia to the Middle East. The port of Piraeus thus acts as an important gateway and a transit 
hub for products from China into Greece and the rest of Europe. Furthermore, it connects well with 
the over €3.5 billion Chinese investments in railway and road networks that Chinese firms are 
undertaking in countries such as Serbia, Montenegro and Hungary41. The planned investments by 
                                                          
38 Smith, H. (2014, 19 June). Chinese carrier Cosco is transforming Piraeus – and has eyes on Thessaloniki, The 
Guardian Newspaper retrieved on 6th December 2014 at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/19/china-
piraeus-greece-cosco-thessaloniki-railways  
39 Paris, C. And Granitsas, A. (2014, 6 June). Greece Open to Selling All its Major Ports.  Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 
on 6th December 2014  from http://online.wsj.com/articles/greece-open-to-selling-all-its-major-ports-1402070040  
40Kemp, J. (2014, 10 November) COLUMN-China's Silk Road challenges U.S. dominance in Asia. Reuters retrieved 6th 
December 2014 from  http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/11/10/china-apec-silkroad-idUSL6N0T03CY20141110  
41 Makris, A. (2014, 1 December). Piraeus Port Authority OKs Agreement with Chinese COSCO. Greek Reporter 
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COSCO to expand the port will put it in a better position to handle more goods thus ensuring a quick 
access to markets.  Figure 5 below gives an overview of the Silk Roads. 
Figure 5: Silk Road Economic Belt and Maritime Silk Belt42 
 
Source: Chandran, (2014) 
In addition, COSCO has managed to improve the efficiency at the port and increase its 
competitiveness in the region. The port of Piraeus is currently among the top 10 container ports in 
Europe and has tripled its handling capacity to more than 4 million containers yearly43. According to 
the rankings of top 100 ports in 2013 by the Containerisation International, the port of Piraeus 
emerged as the most improved port moving from position 77 in 2011 to 46 in 201344. As already 
highlighted, COSCO’s further investments at the port is geared towards ensuring that the port handles 
more containers thus turning it into an important gateway for goods to Europe. These improvements 
caused by COSCO’s operations at the port of Piraeus, brings in a whole new perspective with regard 
to the motivations for Chinese investment in Europe. According to Deng (2009:75), Chinese firms 
are usually driven to invest in developed economies with a desire to acquire strategic assets in order 
to enhance their global competitiveness. Conversely, in the case of Greece, the Chinese company 
COSCO is the one which possess some strategic assets which are beneficial for Greece.  For example, 
                                                          
42Chandran, N. (2014, 17 November). New Silk Road' highlights China's two-speed reform. CNBC retrieved on 6th 
December 2014  at  http://www.cnbc.com/id/102190017#  
43 Paris, C. And Granitsas, A. (2014, 6 June). Greece Open to Selling All its Major Ports.  Wall Street Journal. Retrieved 
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COSCO uses a different labour model that resembles more closely the model used in China than the 
one used in other European ports (Putten, 2014:15). COSCO’s involvement has contributed to 
increased productivity at pier II which rose from 10-12 containers per hour to 44 containers per hour 
(Putten, 2014:16). From this example, it can be argued that Deng’s assumption that the pursuit of 
strategic assets is the key driver for Chinese companies to invest in developed countries can be 
criticized. We argue that COSCO’s investments in Greece may not be driven by the need to access 
strategic assets. In fact, the company possesses some management knowhow which can be adapted 
to other part of the port that is managed by Greece.  
5.3.2 Greece’s government policies as a pull factor 
Following the argument in our conceptual framework, the policies adopted by Greece’s government 
in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis have acted as a key pull factor for Chinese FDI. Specifically, 
the Greek government has been providing different incentives to lure Chinese investors in the 
different sectors in Greece. As already indicated in section 5.2.1 the real estate sector has been one 
of the key targets for privatization after the sovereign debt crisis in Greece, and hence a major area 
for Chinese companies to invest in. The Chinese sudden interest in the real estate sector in Greece 
however, does not only result from the low value of these assets. It also results from some of the 
incentives provided by the Greek government. After the sovereign debt crisis, Greece has been one 
of the countries in Europe that has resorted to attract non EU investors in the real estate sector by 
granting them ‘golden visas’.  Generally, the golden visa gives investors the right to live and travel 
anywhere among the 26 Schengen member states which includes all Western European countries 
apart from Britain45. According to Wise (2014), Greece began issuing out a five year residence permit 
in mid-2013 for investors who could purchase real estate property worth €250,00046. The Chinese 
investors have responded to such incentives and resorted to make several investments in the real estate 
sector in order to gain residency in Europe.  According to an article by Xinhua in the China Daily 
Newspaper in June this year, more and more Chinese investors have been streaming into Greece and 
investing  in the real estate sector since the government decided to issue out golden visas to foreign 
                                                          
45 Rodriguez,C. (2013) Want to live in Europe? “Buy” a residency permit. Contribution in the Forbes magazine 
29/9/2013. Retrieved on 6th December 2014 at : http://www.forbes.com/sites/ceciliarodriguez/2013/09/29/want-to-
live-in-europe-buy-a-residency-permit/ 
46 Wise, P (Sea, sun and easy visas lure China buyers. Contribution in the Financial Times 8/10/2014. Retrieved on 6th 
December 2014 at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d7c1b472-44a6-11e4-ab0c-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3LGJK6FXg 
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property buyers47. This legislation passed by the Greek government can therefore be seen as a pull 
factor for Chinese companies to invest in Greece. Our argument is that the influx of Chinese FDI in 
Greece’s real estate sector, is to a large extent a response to the incentives provided by the Greek 
government in this sector. 
Another form of incentive from the Greek government after the sovereign debt crisis has taken the 
form of tax exemptions and other fiscal incentives towards the Chinese investors. Chinese investors 
particularly in the infrastructure sector have benefitted from such incentives. For example in 2013, 
Greece’s government signed a contract with COSCO requiring the company to expand the port’s 
cargo handling capacity. In return COSCO would be exempted from paying fees to the Piraeus port 
authority (Putten 2014:11). According to Papachristou (2013), this deal would save COSCO at least 
€250 million since their payment to the port’s authority will not resume until 2020 earliest48.   
The tax and financial incentives offered by Greece’s government after the sovereign debt crisis as 
witnessed in the case of COSCO can therefore be seen as pull factors. It is clear that the Greek 
government is indeed desperate for investment, and is trying all possible means to attract and also 
keep investors. This can best be shown in the scenario where COSCO is actually enticed to expand 
its investments in the country even if it means a loss of the Greek government revenues. 
Consequently, the Chinese have found the Greece’s government policies very attractive thus 
encouraging them to invest in the country.  
 
5.4 Chapter conclusion 
Our analysis indicates that Chinese FDI in Europe and the sovereign debt crisis countries have 
increased since the sovereign debt crisis started. The Chinese investments after the sovereign debt 
crisis have mostly been in the energy sector both in the whole of Europe and in countries experiencing 
sovereign debt crisis. Additionally, Chinese companies have diversified their investments in several 
sectors across Europe. An analysis of the countries in sovereign debt crisis indicate that the Chinese 
are investing in different sectors even though these countries are all faced by a sovereign debt crisis.   
                                                          
47 Xinhua (2014) Greece welcomes Chinese premier, expects more investment. Contribution in the China daily. 
Retrieved on 7th December 2014 at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2014livisitbritaingreece/2014-
06/13/content_17586505.htm 
48 Papachristou,H (2013) Piraeus investment deal eases privatization prospects. Reuters 2/9/2013. Retrieved on 7th 
December 2014 at : http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/09/02/us-greece-china-piraeus-idUKBRE98109Q20130902 
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From our analysis of the case of Greece, we have established that privatization has been a facilitating 
factor for the Chinese companies to invest in Greece after the sovereign debt crisis. Some Chinese 
companies like Fosun International and COSCO have diversified their investments in Greece 
following the availability of privatized state owned assets. Other than the privatization of public 
assets, we argue that Chinese investors have been driven by two factors. The first pull factor has been 
the opportunity of accessing European markets. These investors have particularly maximized on this 
aspect through the use of Greece’s Piraeus port as a strategic location that offers a good entry point 
and distribution hub for products from China.  Greece’s government policies are the second pull factor 
for the increased Chinese FDI in Greece. This has taken the form of different incentives offered to 
Chinese investors.  The Golden visa initiative can be seen as an incentive that has attracted Chinese 
investors to the real estate sector in Greece. Furthermore, the case of Greece has brought an interesting 
perspective regarding the motivations behind Chinese FDI in Europe. Our analysis of COSCO’s 
operation at the port of Piraeus has revealed that Greece could benefit from some strategic assets like 
managerial or operational knowhow possessed by COSCO. This challenges the assumption that the 
Chinese invest in Europe for the need of strategic assets.  
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6. Conclusion 
This paper sought to examine how Chinese FDI in Europe has responded to privatization in the wake 
of the sovereign debt crisis. Based on an academic literature review, we found the push and pull 
framework to be the most relevant for examining the driving forces behind Chinese FDI in Europe.  
As our focus was on privatization in Europe in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis, the pull factors 
behind Chinese FDI in Europe was of most interest. The pull factors that we chose were: 1. the   
availability of strategic assets in Europe, 2. Access to European markets, 3. The nature of government 
policies in Europe and 4. The sovereign debt crisis 
In this paper, we established that privatization was a key reaction from the European Union and the 
IMF towards European countries in sovereign debt crisis. We have found out that privatization 
following the sovereign debt crisis, has influenced Chinese FDI flows to Europe.  As we have 
illustrated in the paper, Chinese FDI in overall Europe and the sovereign debt crisis countries 
increased in the period after the crisis. Our case Greece, also experienced an increase in Chinese 
Investments after they started experiencing sovereign debt crisis in 2009. Since Greece signed an 
agreement with the Troika in 2010, they have been compelled to privatize public assets. As a result, 
the infrastructure and real estate sectors in Greece have largely been privatized which offered an 
opportunity for the Chinese to invest in these sectors. Based on this we do not see privatization as a 
driving force behind Chinese FDI in Greece, but rather as a facilitating factor for other driving forces.   
From our analysis, we have established that there are two other factors that have pulled Chinese 
investors to Greece: 1.the opportunity to access to European markets, 2.Greece’s government 
policies. With regard to opportunity in accessing the European market, we have found out that the 
Chinese investors have invested heavily in the infrastructure sector after the sovereign debt crisis. We 
argue that there could be two reasons for this. First of all, Greece is part of the EU and hence this 
offers opportunities for the Chinese investors to enter the European market. Secondly, as shown in 
our analysis, the strategic location of the port of Piraeus offers an entry point for products from China 
to be distributed in European markets. Regarding government policies in Greece, we have established 
that the Chinese investors have been attracted to invest in Greece due to incentives provided by the 
Greek government.  
Even though we cannot use the case of Greece to generalize how Chinese FDI has responded to 
privatization in all European countries, there are still things to be learnt from this case.  The case of 
57 
 
Greece can indicate how Chinese FDI is responding to privatization in other European countries that 
are experiencing sovereign debt crisis. 
6.1 Afterthoughts  
In this paper we have established that Chinese FDI in overall Europe and the sovereign debt crisis 
countries have increased since the sovereign debt crisis started. But what are the impacts of these 
increased amounts of Chinese FDI in Europe in general and these sovereign debt crisis countries in 
particular? In this section we seek to discuss the economic impacts that large amounts of Chinese 
FDI can have on European countries. The discussion will include both the benefits and risks that 
Chinese FDI in Europe can bring.  
 
The increased Chinese FDI flows into Europe have led to fears among the public and various 
scholars. According to Hanemann and Rosen (2012: 54-58), this fear is fueled by four factors. First 
of all, there is a fear that large investments from China can increase the vulnerability of Europe, if 
China suddenly experiences a crisis and is forced to withdraw its investments in Europe. It can be 
argued that this retraction of investments could cause the sovereign debt crisis countries to go into a 
deeper debt crisis, as they are already financial distressed. Secondly, there is a fear that the Chinese 
will “exploit” the European companies by acquiring their technology and management skills and 
then close or move the company to China. This argument posits that the Chinese are investing 
because they want to gain strategic assets, but as illustrated in the conceptual framework of this 
paper, this is not the only driving force behind Chinese FDI. Furthermore as our analysis of the case 
of COSCO in the port of Piraeus has illustrated, Chinese firms can also be a source of strategic 
assets and therefore be beneficial for the host country. 
This fear can therefore only apply for some investments. Third, there is a fear that large Chinese 
FDI flows will cause a distorted competition among companies as Chinese companies are largely 
state-owned and have large amounts of available capital. Finally, Hanemann and Rosen (2012) 
argue that there is a fear that Chinese firms may lead to poor labor and environmental conditions to 
Europe. It can be argued that the sovereign debt crisis countries may tolerate such poor conditions 
because they are eager to attract and keep Chinese investments.  
  
Chinese FDI in Europe can besides risks, also create economic opportunities for the whole of 
Europe and the sovereign debt crisis countries. In fact Shixue (2013) argues that Chinese FDI in 
Europe is a win-win situation, as the EU can benefit from the injection of Chinese capital in a 
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number of ways. First of all, he argues that it can create or safeguard jobs, as the Chinese can 
preserve jobs in companies that are facing financial problems or create more jobs once the company 
has recovered. Secondly, he argues that the Chinese investments can be helpful for Europe, 
especially in a time of crisis. As argued in chapter 5 of this paper, the sovereign debt crisis countries 
were in a desperate need of investments following the sovereign debt crisis. Following Shixue’s 
(2013) argument, the increased Chinese FDI in overall Europe and the sovereign debt crisis 
countries after the crisis has therefore been helpful in restoring these countries’ economic stability. 
Finally, it can increase the productivity in the host country, as the Chinese investors can make the 
company more efficient. For example, as discussed in chapter 5, the productivity in the port of 
Pireaus increased significantly when COSCO got the 35 year concession over a part of the port.  
 
The discussion of the risks and opportunities of Chinese FDI in overall Europe and the sovereign 
debt crisis countries is not emptying the literature on this research field. However, it points to some 
risks that the European countries and especially the sovereign debt crisis countries need to pay 
attention to as the Chinese FDI is increasing after the sovereign debt crisis. Additionally, it argues 
that increased Chinese FDI in overall Europe and the sovereign debt crisis countries can also be 
benefitting. This is especially the case in the wake of the sovereign debt crisis, as the Chinese 
investors are providing the capital that the sovereign debt crisis countries desperately need.  A more 
extensive discussion of both the risks and benefits of Chinese FDI in the sovereign debt crisis 
countries after the crisis need to be assessed by scholars in the future.   
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